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The recent unravelling of the Eurozone’s financial integration raised concerns about
feedback loops between sovereign and banking insolvency. This paper provides a the-
ory of the feedback loop that allows for both domestic bailouts of the banking system and
sovereign debt forgiveness by international creditors or solidarity by other countries. Our
theory has important implications for the re-nationalization of sovereign debt, macropru-
dential regulation, and the rationale for banking unions.
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1 Introduction
The ongoing European crisis first manifested itself in 2009-2010 through increasing sovereign
spreads in the periphery (Figure 1). Around the same time, bank and sovereign CDS spreads
started to move in lockstep, raising questions as to whether a doom loop in which sovereign
fragility would jeopardize banks and in turn bank distress would imperil public finances and
sovereign debt sustainability, might not be in operation. Figure 2 depicts the joint evolution
in Europe’s two poster children. In Ireland, sovereign spreads were negligible until investors
felt that the banking system was becoming a serious issue for the country as a whole; Greece
illustrates the reverse dynamics, with public finances becoming an issue for the banks. But
regardless of whether the initial shock concerned bank balance sheets or sovereign debt, the
spread and the bank CDSs started to co-move. Figure 3 shows that the crisis coincided with
a reversal in the secular trend toward more capital market integration to make way to a re-
fragmentation phase characterized by a re-nationalization of sovereign debt holdings. This
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Figure 1: 10-year sovereign bond yields for major European countries between 01/02/2008 and 06/11/2014.
The data are from Datastream via Bruegel.
reversal was particularly pregnant in Southern Europe, but mechanically happened also in
the core countries.
Rarely has an economic concept faced such opprobrium as the doom loop, from the IMF1
and central bankers to the political establishment and the European Commission, providing
a major impetus for the creation of the European banking union.
This paper seeks to relate these developments to domestic bailouts of the banking system
by the Sovereign on the one hand, and sovereign debt forgiveness by international credi-
tors or country bailouts by other countries on the other hand. An important feature of this
“double-decker bailout” theory is that the fates of Sovereigns and their banks are deeply
intertwined, and yet consolidating their balance sheet would be misleading.
The paper’s main contribution is to detail the doom loop and re-nationalization mecha-
nisms. The paper shows that a re-nationalization of financial markets occurs upon the ac-
crual of bad news about the banks’ balance sheet or the Sovereign’s ability to reimburse
its debts. The first channel goes through banks’ incentives; the “bailout put” (the unpriced
option value of the implicit bailout protection against the downside risk of their domestic
sovereign debt holdings) has a higher value to them in riskier financial straits, and so in bad
times domestic banks will devote more resources to concealing their direct and indirect expo-
sures to the Sovereign. The second channel builds on the Sovereign’s incentives; anticipating
that the collateral damages which its failure would impose on other countries or on foreign
creditors will enable it to obtain assistance or debt forgiveness, and thereby a sustained ac-
cess to capital markets, the Sovereign may be tempted to relax its grip on banks as it now
shares the potential cost of domestic banks’ risk taking with other countries.
It is also the first paper to provide a rationale for externalized banking supervision (a
1See e.g. Lagarde (2012).
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Figure 2: Sovereign CDS spreads and bank CDS spreads of Ireland and Greece. This figure plots the sovereign
CDS spreads and bank CDS spreads for Ireland and Greece for the period 3/1/2007 to 8/31/2010. The bank
CDS spreads is computed as the equal-weighted average of bank CDS spreads for banks headquartered in
Ireland (Allied Irish Bank, Bank of Ireland, Irish Life and Permanent, Governor and Co., BOI) and Greece
(Alpha Bank, Eurobank, National Bank of Greece) respectively. The data are spliced from CMA and Reuters
databases in Datastream based on availability.
feature of many banking unions). It actually unveils two distinct rationales. For a fragile
debtor country, externalization acts as a commitment not to loosen its banking supervision
ex post and thereby imperil its debt’s sustainability to extract bigger concessions from foreign
legacy creditors; a tougher supervision ultimately benefits the domestic country by reducing
its ex-ante cost of borrowing. Externalization can alternatively be motivated by externality
arguments reflecting the demands of foreign countries instead of the domestic country. Lax
domestic supervision increases the probability that other countries will need to come to the
rescue of the distressed one, but does so inefficiently by increasing the rents extracted by
the banking system; the domestic and the foreign countries can all be made better off by
combining a commitment to solidarity from other countries (another feature of many bank-
ing unions) with an externalization of supervision, illustrating a form of complementarity
between prudential and fiscal integration. The paper also discusses alternative externality
arguments. The doom loop is not essential for some of these insights, but the paper shows
that it significantly strengthens them.
Section 2 sets up the framework, which has three dates, 0, 1 and 2. At date 0, the Sovereign
issues domestic bonds that (in this basic version) mature at date 2; the expectation of the date-
2 fiscal capacity drives the sovereign spread. Domestic banks, which will need money for
their date-1 banking activities, manage their liquidity by holding domestic sovereign bonds
and (again, in the basic version of the model) foreign sovereign bonds. Foreign bonds are
safe while domestic sovereign bonds are risky, and so the standard diversification argument
would call for holding no domestic bonds. The Sovereign has some supervisory capability,
but can choose at date 0 to be more lenient in its monitoring of (direct and indirect) bank
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Figure 3: Domestic sovereign debt holdings of periphery vs. core-country banks. This figure, taken from Bat-
tistini et al (2014), plots domestic sovereign debt holdings of periphery vs. core-country banks as a proportion
of the total assets of banks, for the period 01/01/2000 to 09/31/2013. The data are from the ECB.
exposures. At date 1 news accrues, that affects the banks’ solvency (a financial shock) and/or
the Sovereign’s date-2 fiscal capability (a fiscal shock). While the Sovereign puts less weight
on banks than on consumers and so ex ante dislikes transferring resources to the banking
sector, it cares sufficiently about economic activity that in bad states of nature, it cannot
refrain from bailing out banks when facing the fait accompli of a banking liquidity shortfall.
Section 3 unveils the basic mechanism: As banks use sovereign bonds as a store of liq-
uidity, holding them until they need the resources to invest, the solvency of the Sovereign
is reduced for two reasons when the economy suffers an adverse shock. First, there is a di-
rect negative effect of the shock on economic activity and thus on the fiscal revenues of the
Sovereign. Second, there is an indirect effect of the shock that operates through the balance
sheets of banks. The initial fall in the price of public debt hurts the net worth of banks and
thus their investment. If the Sovereign attaches a sufficiently high value to investment, it
bails out the banks. The key point is that these bailouts are financed by issuing additional
debt, and this increase in the stock of debt decreases its price even further. Basically, for every
dollar of bailout that the Sovereign provides to the banks, public debt must increase by more
than a dollar. Thus, there is a “doom loop”, “deadly embrace” or two-way link between
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sovereign and financial balance sheets. A weakening of financial balance sheets leads to a
weakening of the balance sheet of the Sovereign because it prompts bailouts that increase
the stock of public debt. At the same time, a weakening of the balance sheet of the Sovereign
has direct effects on financial balance sheets because banks hold public debt. The multiplier
reflecting the loss in sovereign bond price increases with the extent of home bias.
Section 3 then investigates the banks’ and the Sovereign’s incentives to seek and prevent
risk taking, respectively. When banks can count on bailouts by the Sovereign, they optimally
diversify as little as supervision allows them to, so as to enjoy the maximal put on taxpayer
money. Conversely, the Sovereign would like to limit bailouts and force diversification on
the banks. We connect these results with the celebrated Bulow-Rogoff (1988, 1991) argument
against debt buybacks. In an economy with no cost of default and no financial intermedi-
aries, Bulow and Rogoff show that debt buybacks are a giveaway to legacy foreign creditors
and reduce the country’s welfare. The banks’ purchase of domestic bonds resembles a buy-
back. We first show that if the default cost is sufficiently large, the Bulow-Rogoff result is
overturned. But when the buyback is operated through financial intermediaries that may
require a bailout by the Sovereign, the Bulow-Rogoff result is reinstated. This result empha-
sizes that consolidating the balance sheets of the Sovereign and its banks is mistaken, even
when the former fully bails out the latter.
While direct holdings of domestic bonds are easily measured during a stress test, they
may not be so on a continuous basis; furthermore, and mainly, banks may have shrouded
exposures to the domestic bond market though derivatives, guarantees or a correlation of
the banking book with domestic bonds. We accordingly assume that supervision is imperfect
and study the extent to which banks are willing to incur costs so as to evade diversification
regulation. We provide a first rationale for the re-nationalization of financial markets in
bad times: the bailout put enjoyed by banks is more valuable to banks in periods of crisis,
vindicating efforts to evade regulations on exposures.
When debt reimbursement prospects are bleak following an adverse date-1 shock, the
legacy sovereign debt ends up on the wrong side of the legacy creditors’ Laffer curve once
likely bailouts and debt increases are factored in; so legacy creditors may then engage in
debt forgiveness. Similarly, countries have an incentive to exercise solidarity and bail out
the country (or, equivalently in the presence of bank bailouts, its banks) so as to prevent
spillovers on their own economy and society. Section 4 shows that these two forms of trans-
fers to the country make it optimal for the Sovereign to turn a blind eye on undiversified bank
portfolios at date 0 exactly when the situation looks grim, a prediction that fits well with the
recent re-nationalization of sovereign debt in the Eurozone. In this context we provide the
two above-mentioned arguments, a commitment-based one and an externality-based one, in
favor of a banking union with centralized supervision.
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Our model assumes that the only way for domestic banks to take risk is by investing in
risky domestic sovereign bonds. Of course, in practice, banks can take risk by investing in
a variety of risky assets: risky foreign debt, equities, currencies, etc. There would also be
incentives for lax supervision as well as a rationale for a banking union in the presence of
debt forgiveness or country solidarity in an alternative model with an alternative risky asset
instead of domestic sovereign debt. However, in Section 5, we argue that domestic sovereign
debt plays has special attributes that make it particularly relevant for these arguments. First,
domestic sovereign debt gives rise to the doom loop while other risky assets do not. Second,
the return on risky domestic sovereign debt has a specific covariance structure with the liq-
uidity shocks of domestic banks and with the fiscal shocks of the domestic Sovereign. For
instance, it is typically more correlated with both than the return on risky foreign sovereign
debt, so that risk shifting and lax supervision are more likely to take place with domestic
risky domestic sovereign debt than with risky foreign sovereign debt.
Finally, we pursue a number of extensions and robustness checks in Appendix B, which
we summarize in Section 6. Missing proofs can be found in Appendix A.
Relationship to the literature. Our paper connects with several strands of literature. First,
it is related to a recent literature on doom loops in closed economies (see e.g. Acharya et al
2015, Cooper-Nikolov 2013, and Bocola 2016). Because of its closed-economy focus, this liter-
ature does not analyze topics such as debt re-nationalization, and domestic vs. international
banking supervision that feature prominently in our analysis.
Second, our paper is related to an emerging literature on sovereign debt re-nationalization
in open economies. Overall, this literature offers alternative hypotheses for sovereign debt
re-nationalization and therefore predictions and policy implications that differ from the unique
ones of our model. Our contribution is therefore complementary with existing work, and
demonstrates the richness of the economics of interactions between sovereign and bank sol-
vency. The proposed theories of debt re-nationalization can be classified into three broad
categories: (i) discrimination theories; (ii) risk-shifting theories; and (iii) financial repression
theories.
Discrimination theories (i) rely on selective domestic sovereign defaults on foreign banks
but not domestic banks. As a result, domestic banks secure a higher returns on domestic
sovereign bonds than foreign banks. This difference is higher in bad times when sovereign
bond yields are high, leading to a re-nationalization of domestic sovereign debt (see e.g.
Broner et al 2013).
Risk-shifting theories (ii) rely on domestic banks preferring the risk profiles of domestic
sovereign bonds. This preference is stronger in bad times when sovereign bond yields are
high, leading to a re-nationalization of domestic sovereign debt. This is the logic underlying
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Gennaioli et al (2014a), where domestic banks find domestic sovereign bonds attractive be-
cause their ex-post return is positively correlated with their ex-post marginal productivity. A
slightly different and more extreme version of this theory which is often discussed (see e.g.
Acharya-Steffen 2015 and Acharya et al 2015) assumes that domestic banks automatically go
bankrupt in the event of a domestic sovereign default and domestic bank equity-holders find
domestic sovereign bonds attractive because they can shift the associated ex-post losses to
the bank creditors.
Financial repression theories (iii) rely on moral suasion by which the Sovereign may co-
erce or incentivize domestic banks to buy domestic sovereign bonds at above market prices
in order to reduce its financing cost. This motive is stronger in bad times when sovereign
yields are high, leading to re-nationalization of domestic sovereign debt. Chari et al (2014)
develop a model along these lines in the context of a closed economy.
Our theory of debt re-nationalization can be broadly categorized as a risk-shifting theory,
but of a different form than that proposed in the literature. In our model, banks take risks
by loading up on domestic sovereign bonds. This can happen for two reasons: (a) because
banks find a way to evade domestic supervision (as in Section 3.3); or (b) because domestic
supervisors relax domestic supervision (as in Section 4). Mechanism (a) is most compara-
ble to the risk-shifting theories mentioned above but risk shifting by domestic banks into
domestic bonds occurs for a different reason: Because they are protected by bailouts, and
so they can shift the ex-post losses associated with bad domestic fiscal news to domestic
taxpayers (instead of shifting them to bank creditors in the risk-shifting theories mentioned
above). Mechanism (b) arises when the cost of bailouts can itself be shifted to international
creditors via debt forgiveness or sovereign transfers from foreign countries. Mechanism (b)
bears some resemblance with Uhlig (2014) who proposes a model where the Sovereign of a
country in a monetary union can, by relaxing financial supervision and letting banks load
up on domestic sovereign bonds, achieve its objective of increasing long-term government
spending. Domestic banks are willing to load up on domestic sovereign bonds because it is
exogenously assumed that they can shift some of the ex-post losses to the monetary union’s
central bank and to the domestic taxpayer. This reduces sovereign financing costs. Livshits
and Schoors (2009) develop a related model in a closed economy where a domestic supervi-
sor can have an incentive to let banks load up on risky sovereign bonds in order to reduce
sovereign financing costs. Banks go along because they can shift the ex-post losses to domes-
tic depositors in the even of a sovereign default.
These theories have different implications for whether sovereign debt re-nationalization
is associated with a doom loop or not, and whether it amplifies or mitigates domestic sovereign
credit worthiness concerns. In our model, there are doom loops and the two mechanisms
for debt re-nationalization amplify domestic sovereign credit worthiness or domestic banks’
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health concerns: Under mechanism (a), it leads to more bailouts and more domestic sovereign
defaults; and under mechanism (b), it leads to more bailouts and more debt forgiveness or
more sovereign transfers from foreign countries. In Broner et al (2013), unlike in our paper,
there is no doom loop between banks and sovereigns but instead a one-way contagion from
sovereign risk to domestic economic risk, and no financial supervision.2 Like in our paper,
sovereign debt re-nationalization amplifies domestic sovereign credit worthiness concerns,
but for a different reason: because increased domestic sovereign debt holdings by domestic
banks crowds out investment in the real economy. In Gennaioli et al (2013), unlike in our pa-
per, there is no doom loop, and debt re-nationalization mitigates domestic sovereign credit
worthiness concerns because of the disciplining effect of bank holdings of domestic debt on
sovereign debt repayment.3 This disciplining effect is also emphasized in Chari et al (2014).4
Our paper is unique in explicitly analyzing the role of lax financial supervision in sovereign
debt re-nationalization in a welfare-based framework and showing that it gives rise to a ra-
tionale for banking unions in the form of delegation of financial supervision to a suprana-
tional authority: Either because of a time-inconsistency problem in domestic financial su-
pervision when there is debt forgiveness; or because of supervisory externalities when there
are sovereign transfers from foreign countries, in which case it comes together with commit-
ments to solidarity.5
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These theories are difficult to tell apart empirically. Acharya-Steffen (2015) and Acharya
et al (2015) use a cross-sectional data strategy. Acharya-Steffen (2015) find some evidence for
risk-shifting theories (large banks and banks with high short-term leverage have more expo-
sure to periphery debt, especially in periphery countries). They document that some of this
shifting of risk comes together with regulatory arbitrage whereby banks exploit the low risk
weights of risky sovereign debt (banks with high risk-weighted assets and low Tier-1 capital
have more exposure to periphery debt). They also find some evidence for moral suasion the-
ories (periphery banks which have been bailed out have more exposure to periphery debt).
Acharya et al (2015) find additional evidence for risk-shifting theories but not for moral sua-
sion theories (using different measures of government influence). The evidence presented in
2Two-way contagion arises in an extension of their model in which the cost of default is proportional to the
amount of defaulted debt, with the proportion decreasing with the capital stock.
3See Perez (2015) for some evidence consistent with this effect in a set of emerging economies.
4These disciplining effects arise because default costs are small enough that defaults are strategic at the
margin. We purposefully abstract from these well-understood effects in our model by assuming that default
costs are large enough that defaults are mechanical at the margin (domestic sovereign debt is always repaid
if it can be repaid). Which assumption is more reasonable is a matter of empirical debate. Our assumption
allows us to isolate to abstract from strategic default considerations and to focus squarely on the rich budgetary
implications of doom loops and sovereign debt re-nationalization.
5The time-inconsistency problem in financial supervision is related to the one identified in the debt dilution
literature (see e.g. Bizer and DeMarzo 1992).
6Broner et al (2013) put forth a different rationale for a banking union: A banking union is assumed to reduce
discrimination between domestic and foreign investors.
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these papers is therefore broadly supportive of the importance of risk-shifting theories, but
does not permit to tell apart the different risk-shifting theories (shifting domestic sovereign
risk from bank equity-holders to bank creditors vs. from banks to taxpayers).
2 Model
2.1 Setup
We consider the following economy. There are three dates t ∈ {0, 1, 2} and a single good at
every date.
The economy is populated by international investors, a continuum of mass one of do-
mestic bankers and a continuum of mass one of domestic consumers. In addition, there is a
domestic government, which we call the Sovereign.
Uncertainty is gradually resolved over time. At date 1, a state of the world is realized
s ∈ S, with (full support) probability distribution dπ(s), where S is an interval of R+. The
bankers’ balance sheets and the fiscal capacity of the Sovereign depend on the realization of
the state of the world s.
Private agents: international investors, bankers and consumers. International investors
have a large endowment in every period. Their utility V∗t = Et[∑
2
s=t c∗s ] at date t is linear
over consumption, and so the international rate of interest is equal to 0.
Consumers’ utility VCt = Et[c
C
2 ] at date t is linear over consumption at date 2. They have
a random endowment E ∈ [0, ∞) at date 2, with probability distribution function f (E|s) and
cumulative distribution function F(E|s). The Sovereign’s only fiscal resources are at date
2: The Sovereign can tax the (random) endowment E of domestic consumers. The endow-
ment E can hence be interpreted as the fiscal capacity of the Sovereign. We assume that
∂( f (E|s)/(1−F(E|s)))
∂s ≤ 0 and that
∂( f (E|s)/(1−F(E|s)))
∂E > 0. The first inequality will imply that
decreases in s are bad news for the fiscal capacity of the Sovereign; the second is a monotone
hazard rate condition that will imply quasi-concave Laffer curves. The two conditions are
equivalent if s shifts the distribution uniformly so that F(E|s) = F(E − s). As usual, one
can think of E as the consumers’ disposable income beyond some incompressible level of
consumption.
Bankers’ utility VBt = Et[c
B
2 ] at date t is linear over consumption at date 2. They have an
endowment A at date 0. At date 1, in state s, they have a fixed-size investment opportunity
which pays off at date 2. They must invest I(s) in order to reap payoff ρ1(s) where ρ1(s) >
I(s). The dependence of I on s more generally stands for liquidity (or financial) shocks faced
by banks. We assume that dI(s)ds ≤ 0 so that low s states are states in which banks badly need
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cash. We also define I = mins∈S I(s) and Ī = maxs∈S I(s). For the investment to be feasible,
though, the banker needs either to have enough date-1 cash to cover I(s), or to receive a
bailout from the Sovereign equal to (at least) the shortfall.
We assume that the return from the investment project of bankers cannot be pledged to
outside investors, and as result, bankers cannot raise outside funding at date 1 (see Appendix
B.3 for a relaxation of this assumption). Instead, they must self-finance the investment project
I(s). Therefore, at date 0, bankers trade their endowment A for financial assets (stores of
value), part or all of which they sell at date 1 to finance their investment project.7 We assume
that A ≥ Ī so that if bankers manage or decide to preserve their wealth between dates 0 and
1, they can always finance their investment project. But they may decide otherwise and face
of shortage of funds, in which case the Sovereign will need to choose between a bailout and
the absence of investment.
Assets. In the basic model, there are no domestic stores of values, except for sovereign
bonds, whose supply is limited by the country’s ability to reimburse. Financial assets thus
are assumed to come in two forms, domestic sovereign bonds in amount B0, and foreign
bonds in unlimited supply. Both domestic and foreign bonds are claims to a unit of good at
date 2.
We look for a symmetric equilibrium, in which banks all choose the same portfolio. We
denote by b0 and b∗0 the representative bank’s holdings of domestic sovereign bonds and
foreign bonds. We assume that there are no short sales so that b∗0 ≥ 0 and b0 ≥ 0.
Foreign bonds—which could be either private bonds or foreign sovereign bonds—are
safe, and hence their price is always 1. By contrast, we assume that domestic bonds are risky
because the domestic Sovereign might default. We denote their price in period 0 by p0 and
their price in period 1 by p1(s). We assume that the amount that the Sovereign needs to
finance at t = 0 is greater than A : p0B0 > A so that the marginal holder of domestic bonds
is an international investor.
Welfare. Letting µ(s) denote the mass of bankers who undertake their investment project,
the Sovereign evaluates at each point in time welfare Wt by subtracting default costs (to
be introduced below) from Et[cC2 + β
BcB2 + β
I(s)µ(s)]. The latter expression is a weighted
average of consumer consumption cC2 , banker welfare c
B
2 = ρ1(s)µ(s) and total investment
µ(s). We assume that 0 < βB < 1, and so pure consumption transfers to bankers are costly.
We assume that the Sovereign puts substantial weight on economic activity and bankers
βI(s) + βBρ1(s) > I(s) ensuring that it wants to use taxpayer money to make sure the bank’s
investment happens.
7This feature resembles Woodford (1990).
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Microfoundations. This paragraph can be skipped without loss for the understanding of
the paper. We sketch credit-crunch foundations of this welfare function, following Holm-
ström and Tirole (1997) to which we refer for a more elaborate model. At date 0, each banker
makes an investment in knowledge/staff so as to be able to invest in a mass 1 of firms, each
with investment need I(s) at date 1 and no net worth. Suppose that a fraction µ(s) ≤ 1 of
these firms are financed at date 1. At date 2, firms succeed or fail (then return 0). Success is
guaranteed if none of the banker, the managers and the workers shirks. Otherwise, success
accrues with probability 0. Shirking for a banker brings benefit ρ1(s), shirking for a firm
manager brings benefit ρM1 (s), shirking for a firm worker brings benefit ρ
W
1 (s). Therefore
incentive payments ρ1(s), ρM1 (s), and ρ
W
1 (s) per firm are required to discipline its banker,
manager and workers. There is no payoff beyond the incentive payoffs of these stakeholders
(we relax this assumption in Appendix B.3). We assume for simplicity that managers and
workers are cashless, so that only the banker can finance investment in the firm at date 1. We
also assume that ρ1(s) > I(s) so that it is in the private interest of the banker to finance as
many of these firms as it is able to. In total, in order the finance a fraction µ(s) of firms, a
total amount µ(s)I(s) of bank capital is needed. In this model, βI(s) = β̃MρM1 (s) + β̃
WρW1 (s)
and βB = β̃B where β̃M, β̃W , and β̃B are the three categories of stakeholders’ welfare weights.
What makes “banks” banks? The term βI(s)µ(s) in the social welfare function captures
an externality on other agents in the economy, namely the welfare benefit for other banking
stakeholders (borrowers, workers), from the banks’ ability to invest. This modeling of social
preferences thus allows for a wide range of preferences among economic agents. A heavy
weight βI put by the Sovereign on banking activities and the concomitant bailouts is what
distinguishes the “banks” from other enterprises, while βB < 1 ensures that the Sovereign
would not ex ante like to bail out the banks.
The “bailout” terminology can be justified as follows. A bank that has insufficient liq-
uidity to cover the investment cost I(s) at date 1 must forgo its investment project unless
the Sovereign steps in and supplies the shortfall. As described, such a targeted bailout pre-
vents a substantial downsizing relative to expectations, but is not triggered by the threat of
bankruptcy as the bank issue no debt at date 0. However, one can write a mathematically
equivalent model in which the bank faces no date-1 liquidity shock but owes pre-existing
debt at date 1.8 If the return from assets owned by the bank’s assets is short of the date-1
8In this alternative model, banks owe I(s) in hard debt at date 1 (it can neither be renegotiated nor repur-
chased) and each bank owns a mass one of investment projects at date 0. If a bank repays its debt, its investment
projects pays off at date 2. If a bank cannot repay its debt, it goes bankrupt and its investment projects do not
pay off at date 2. This model is isomorphic to the one in the paper. The only difference is that there is out-
right discrete bankruptcy rather than continuous downsizing, but it makes no difference for the analysis since
bailouts are always maximal.
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debt repayment, then the bank goes bankrupt and µ(s) = 0 unless the Sovereign brings cash.
In this reinterpretation, bankruptcy occurs off-the-equilibrium path and is prevented by a
bailout.
Sovereign debt, bailouts, defaults. The domestic Sovereign makes decisions sequentially,
without commitment. At date 1, the Sovereign decides whether to undertake a bailout of its
domestic banks. At date 2, the Sovereign repays its debt or defaults.
The Sovereign issues some outstanding bonds B0 at date 0. We assume for the moment
that these bonds mature at date 2 (in Appendix B.1, we investigate whether conclusions are
altered by a shorter maturity and whether the Sovereign optimally issues long-term bonds).
At date 1, the Sovereign inspects the balance sheets of banks that apply for a bailout
and so can, if it so desires, tailor individual bailout levels to specific liquidity shortages of
applying banks (which in equilibrium will end up being identical).9 We denote by X(s) the
total transfer to the banks. In order to finance this transfer, the Sovereign must issue new
bonds B1(s) − B0. Throughout the paper, we maintain the assumption that the Sovereign
can always raise enough resources to bail out all banks; that is, there exists B1(s) such that
p1(s)(B1(s)− B0) = X(s) where the date-1 price p1(s) reflects both the direct effect of s and
the increase in sovereign debt.10 We relax this assumption in Appendix B.2.
Our assumption that βI(s) + βBρ1(s) > I(s) ensures that Sovereign always chooses to
bail out the financial sector if such a bailout is needed, implying that X(s) = max{I(s) −
(b∗0 + p1(s)b0), 0}.11
At date 2, the Sovereign decides whether to default on its debt. The Sovereign cannot
discriminate between foreign and domestic bond holders, and hence cannot selectively de-
fault on foreigners. The Sovereign incurs a fixed cost Φ if it defaults on its debt, which we
assume is high enough Φ > B0.12 This implies in particular that the Sovereign only defaults
if it cannot pay its debt, that is if and only if B1(s) > E.
9Alternatively, we could have followed Farhi and Tirole (2012) or Mengus (2013a,b) in assuming that in-
dividual portfolios are imperfectly observed at the bailout date and that these portfolios are endogenously
heterogeneous. This would make bailouts more costly and the analysis more complex, without altering the
basic insights in our context.
10The assumption that the Sovereign sets the amount it promises to reimburse, B1(s), rather than the amount
it borrows eliminates any multiplicity associated with erratic expectations as in Calvo (1988).
11Note that the Sovereign does not issue new bonds solely for the purpose of financing date-1 consumption.
Formally, this is the case in our model, as domestic residents consume at date 2 only. But, even if, say, consumers
derive utility from date-1 consumption, it can be shown that, as long as the default cost Φ is sufficiently large,
the Sovereign never issues new debt to finance date-1 consumption, whether or not it bails out its banks.
12Starting with B0 < Φ, the Sovereign would never issue B1(s) > Φ. Such an issuance would yield zero
revenues since it would lead to default with probability 1 and hence be associated with a zero price p1(s) = 0.
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Supervisory game. As we will note, banking bailouts provide banks with an incentive
to take risk. Conversely, and in the absence of sovereign debt forgiveness, the supervisor
would like to limit risk taking. In general, an individual bank’s exposure to domestic bonds
depends on a costly supervisory effort to detect hidden exposures and on the bank’s costly
effort to make these exposures opaque.13
Rather than formalize the supervisory game in its entire generality we assume that there
is an exogenous supervisory capability r̄. For a given supervisory capability r̄, the supervisor
can then decide to be lenient by setting an effective minimum diversification requirement
r ≤ r̄. Except in Section 3.3, we assume that the supervisor can perfectly enforce the effective
minimum diversification requirement r, so that a banker must set b∗0 ≥ r.
Informational assumptions. We make the following informational assumptions. The su-
pervisory capability r̄ and the amount of debt B0 are publicly observable at date 0. The
decision regarding supervisory leniency r and the portfolios of banks are not observable to
international investors at date 0. The bailout X(s) and the amount of debt B1(s) are publicly
observable at date 1.14
The Sovereign’s supervisory capability r̄ in practice depends on the size and expertise of
13That direct and indirect exposures may be hard to assess, is shared by a literature that emphasizes the
difficulty of monitoring banks: See Farhi-Tirole (2012) and Mengus (2013a, b), as well as in Philippon-Skreta
(2012) and Tirole (2012) in their study of the design of government interventions to rescue the financial sector
in the presence of asymmetric information on banks’ balance sheets.
14It does not matter whether the banks already acquire some domestic debt at date 0 before the supervisory
stance r is decided and then readjust their portfolios, or simply form their portfolios in one shot after r is de-
cided. This is because r is unobservable, and hence p0 is independent of r. It also does not matter whether r
and the portfolio of banks are publicly observable at date 1 or not. The assumption that p0B0 > A is a conser-
vative assumption that ensures that the marginal investor remains an international investor even if supervision
is relaxed relative to market expectations.
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the supervisory staff and on the prudential rules disallowing or disincentivizing the use of
complex products whose risk is hard to assess. The banks’ holdings b0 should be interpreted
as a mixture of things: straight bonds, derivative products that involve contingencies based
on bond prices, and more generally exposures to the domestic economy. The supervisor’s
imperfect information about b0 therefore has a variety of sources: straight bond holdings
may not be monitored in real time; derivative products involve difficult-to-assess exposures
to sovereign bond prices; finally, banks are exposed in many ways to the domestic economy,
whose sectors are (to varying degrees) affected by the Sovereign’s state. Finally, the choice
of supervisory intensity r ≤ r̄ can be interpreted as a form of moral hazard, in which the
supervisor turns a blind eye on dangerous exposures; one can think of r̄ as the de jure reg-
ulatory requirement and r as the de facto supervisory reality. To the extent that r̄ is dictated
by a supranational institution (e.g. the Basel Committee or the regional transpositions of its
rules), domestic authorities have no incentive to disclose their non-compliance (r < r̄).15
Figure 4 summarizes the timeline.
2.2 Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium of the model.
Bond prices and issuance Laffer Curve. Because the marginal investor in domestic bonds
is a risk-neutral international investor, the prices of domestic bonds at dates 0 and 1 simply
reflect the relevant conditional default probability:




At date 1 in state s, the Sovereign can thus collect (B1 − B0)[1− F(B1|s)] by issuing B1 −
B0. This revenue is strictly quasi-concave in B1 and increasing in s from our assumptions on
the distribution of the date-2 endowment E. We call it the issuance Laffer curve.16
15The non-observability of r is therefore reasonable; but we have checked that the qualitative results also hold
in the slightly more complex case in which supervisory intensity is observed by the market at date 0. The first
version of this paper (March 12, 2014) actually focused on that case.
16Three related date-1 Laffer curves will play a key role in the paper. First, the Laffer curve reflects the date-1
market value B1[1− F(B1|s)] of debt with the face value of debt B1. Second, the issuance Laffer curve described
in the text above refers to the date-1 market value (B1 − B0)[1− F(B1|s)] of the newly issued debt with face
value B1 − B0 if it already owes legacy debt with face value B0. Third, the legacy creditors’ Laffer curve refers the
date-1 market value B0[1− F(B1|s)] of debt with face value B0. Sections 2 and 3 only discuss the issuance Laffer
curve. The Laffer curve and the legacy creditors’ Laffer curve come into play in Sections 4 and 5.
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Bankers’ portfolio choice. In a symmetric equilibrium, bankers invest their net worth into
foreign bonds b∗0 ≥ 0 and domestic bonds b0 ≥ 0 so that
A = b∗0 + p0b0.
At date 1, their pre-bailout net worth is b∗0 + p1(s)b0. If their pre-bailout net worth falls short
of the investment size I(s), they receive a bailout X(s) = I(s) − (b∗0 + p1(s)b0) from the
Sovereign. If their pre-bailout net worth exceeds the investment size I(s), they simply save
the difference by acquiring either domestic or international bonds (at this stage, they are
indifferent between both since they are risk neutral over date-2 consumption).
Their expected utility is therefore VB0 =
∫
[ρ1(s) + max{b∗0 + p1(s)b0 − I(s), 0}] dπ(s). Be-
cause p0 =
∫
p1(s)dπ(s), I(s) is decreasing in s, and A ≥ Ī, each banker chooses b∗0 = r.17
This is intuitive: Bankers have an incentive to take as much risk as possible to extract the
biggest possible expected bailout from the Sovereign. Thus all bankers behave identically
and take as much risk as is tolerated by supervision.
Impact of bailouts on date-1 bond issuance. At date 1 in state s, financing the bailout
X(s) = max{I(s)− r− (A− r) p1(s)
p0
, 0}
requires issuing B1(s)− B0 new bonds with
p1(s)[B1(s)− B0] = X(s).
Date-1 debt B1(s) ≥ B0 is the smallest solution of the following fixed-point equation




The difference between the left-hand side and the right-hand side of this equation is quasi-
concave because of our monotone hazard ratio property, and so if it has a solution (which
we assume), this solution B1(s) ≥ B0 is unique on the upward sloping part of the issuance
Laffer curve.
A straightforward investigation of condition (3) shows that debt B1(s) (its price p1(s))
is decreasing (increasing) in s until a threshold s̃ at which bailouts are no longer needed
17Because p1(s) is increasing in s and I(s) is decreasing in s, there exists s̃ such that b∗0(1−
p1(s)
p0
) + p1(s)p0 A−
I(s) ≥ 0 if and only if s ≥ s̃. Note that if p1(s) ≥ p0, then s ≥ s̃. Now consider b∗′0 > b∗0 . We necessarily have










Supervisory intensity. When setting the effective minimum diversification requirement






















taking p0 as given (because r is not publicly observable at date 0) but taking into account the
impact of r on p1(s) and B1(s) through
p1(s) = 1− F(B1(s)|s),




Welfare decomposition. Using the equilibrium equations (1), (2), and (3), we can derive an
enlightening efficiency-rent decomposition of equilibrium welfare

















R0 = −(1− βB)
∫
min{r + (A− r) p1(s)
p0
− I(s), 0}dπ(s), (6)
which using the equilibrium martingale property of prices (2), has the alternative expression
R0 = (1− βB)
∫ [
max{r + (A− r) p1(s)
p0
− I(s), 0} − [A− I(s)]
]
dπ(s). (7)
18More precisely, there exists a cutoff s̃ such bailouts occur if and only if s < s̃, so that B1(s) > B0 if s < s̃ and
B1(s) = B0 for s ≥ s̃. Furthermore, we can show that dB1(s)ds < 0 for s < s̃ and similarly that
dp1(s)
ds > 0 for s < s̃,
and for all s if ∂( f (E|s)/(1−F(E|s)))∂s < 0 (strict inequality) .
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The term E0 is a pure efficiency term. It accounts for the cost p0B0 of legacy debt repayment
and the cost of defaults Φ
∫
F(B1(s)|s)dπ(s).19 The term R0 ≥ 0 is a pure distributive term,




min{r + (A− r) p1(s)
p0
− I(s), 0}dπ(s).
It accounts for the cost of the rents extracted by bankers at the expense of domestic consumers
because of bailouts. These rents reduce welfare because bankers carry a lower welfare weight
than consumers βB < 1 so thatR0 = (1− βB)P0.
It is important to keep in mind that the decompositionW0 = E0−R0 in (4) as well as the
alternative expression (7) for R0 make use of the martingale property of equilibrium prices
(2). As a result, they are only valid in equilibrium. They cannot be used off equilibrium to
analyze the ex-post incentives of supervisors to set the effective diversification requirement r,
for a given p0, because (2) might not hold. Instead we then use a more general decomposition
W0 = E0 −R0 + C0, (8)
with E0 given by (5),R0 given by (6), and C0 given by
C0 = βB
∫ [





The term C0 is a corrective term that accounts for the rents that bankers extract at the expense
of foreign legacy creditors when the martingale property of prices (2) does not hold. This is
because the price p0 at which banker purchase debt from foreign legacy creditors deviates
from the expected future probability of repayment
∫
p1(s)dπ(s). We have C0 = 0 in equi-
librium when (2) holds so that p0 =
∫
p1(s)dπ(s). But off equilibrium, we have C0 > 0 if
p0 <
∫
p1(s)dπ(s) and C0 < 0 if p0 >
∫
p1(s)dπ(s).
3 Sovereign and Financial Balance Sheets Doom Loops
We can now show how a shock to banks’ or the Sovereign’s balance sheet (or both) is ampli-
fied through a mutual feedback loop: for instance, when the banks’ balance sheet is already
fragile, a higher liquidity need experienced by banks requires a larger bailout, implies a
19The cost of legacy debt repayment p0B0 can be seen as the cost of repayment of foreign legacy creditors. It
occurs both ex ante at date 0 for the foreign legacy creditors who have sold their debt to bankers and ex post at
date 2 for those who have held on to it.
17
lower price of sovereign debt, which in turn further deteriorates the banks’ balance sheet,
and so forth. We then prove two very intuitive propositions: For a given supervisory capa-
bility, it is never optimal for the supervisor to engage in supervisory leniency; furthermore
the Sovereign would like to force banks to fully diversify if it had the means to do so. The
common thread behind these two results is that risk-taking by banks generates both a costly
redistribution from consumers to bankers and a loss of efficiency associated with more fre-
quent defaults. We then compare these maximum-diversification results with the Bulow-
Rogoff no-debt-buyback precept, and show that these similar conclusions are motivated by
completely different mechanisms. We finally show that when the model is extended so as to
give banks the possibility, at a cost, to partially evade diversification (for a given regulatory
intensity r), then they choose re-nationalization strategies when bad news accrue.20
3.1 Amplification Mechanism
This feedback loop can be seen through the following fixed-point equation for the date-1
price of domestic sovereign bonds
p1(s) = 1− F(B1(s)|s), (10)
where






Using the implicit function theorem, we can then derive the following comparative statics
result, assuming that a bailout occurs in state s, i.e. that s < s̃.
Proposition 1 (Feedback Loop). The sensitivity of date-1 bond prices p1(s) to the state s < s̃ when












The numerator on the right-hand side of equation (12) encapsulates the direct effect of
the change in s on the debt price p1(s) if there were no change in the price at which the
20In our model, ruling out bailouts, if possible, would be desirable. Bianchi (2016), Stavrakeva (2013), and
Keister (2016) argue that bailouts can have desirable properties despite the associated moral hazard. In Bianchi
(2016) and Stavrakeva (2013), this occurs because bailouts help relax borrowing constraints in crises. In Keister
(2016), this happens because bailouts mitigate the incentives of depositors to run on banks in an environment
à la Diamond-Dybvig (1983). These papers stress that the optimal policy mix might involve bank bailouts
combined with macroprudential policy. This possibility could arise in our model, but we mostly focus on the
case where it does not by assuming that banks have enough net worth to take advantage of future investment
opportunities provided that they manage their liquidity prudently.
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Sovereign issues bonds to finance the bailout and at which bankers liquidate their sovereign
bond holdings. The first term in the numerator captures the direct change in the probability
of no-default at constant investment size I(s). The second term in the numerator captures
the direct impact of the change in the investment size I(s).
The denominator takes the form of a multiplier, which represents the indirect effect of a
change in s on the debt price p1(s) through the change in the price at which the Sovereign
issues bonds and at which bankers liquidate their sovereign bond holdings. The multiplier
is higher, the larger the amount of foreign-held debt B1(s)− (B0 − b0) = I(s)−rp1(s) that must be
issued to finance the bailout (and hence the higher the amount of domestic debt held by do-
mestic banks, i.e. the lower is r), and the larger the semi-elasticity 1p1(s) f (B1(s)|s) of the debt
price p1(s) to additional debt issuances. This multiplier captures the feedback loop between
banks and the Sovereign as an amplification mechanism: An increase in default probability
reduces the price p1(s), which increases the required bailout X(s) and the quantity of bonds
B1(s) − B0 that must be issued at date 1, which further reduces the price p1(s), etc., ad in-
finitum; similarly, an increase in banks’ financing needs which increases the required bailout
X(s) and hence the quantity of bonds B1(s)− B0 that must be issued at date 1, which reduces
the price p1(s), and increases the required bailout X(s), etc. ad infinitum.21
Can balance sheets be consolidated? It is instructive to view the doom loop through the
lens of balance sheet consolidation. In a nutshell, we argue that given p0 and B0, the banks’
and the Sovereign’s balance sheets: (1) can be consolidated in the bailout region for the pur-
pose of predicting the level of state-contingent sovereign debt B1(s) owed at date 2, and
therefore the likelihood of sovereign default; (2) cannot be consolidated for the same pur-
pose in the no-bailout region; and (3) cannot be consolidated for the purpose of predicting
the domestic distribution of welfare as well as total domestic welfare.
Points (1) and (2) can be understood as follows. At date 0, banks have positions b0 and
b∗0 in domestic and foreign debt. Similarly, the Sovereign has positions −B0 and 0 in the two
assets. The consolidated positions in the two assets are b0 − B0 and b∗0 . In the no-bailout
region, sovereign default at date 2 hinges on B1(s) = B0. And so the probability of sovereign
default is not pinned down by consolidated positions, which also incorporate banks’ posi-
tions. By contrast, in the bailout region, B1(s) is a function solely of consolidated positions:
[1− F(B1(s)|s)][B1(s)–(B0− b0)] = I(s)− b∗0 . Point (3) is immediate since the rents of bankers
21We have assumed that the marginal buyer, the international investors, exhibits no risk-aversion. It would be
interesting to analyze whether the presence of risk-aversion by international investors would amplify the doom
loop (it would affect both p0 and p1(s)) and whether a shock to the stochastic discount factor of international
investors could actually trigger the doom loop in the case with short debt maturity. In addition, if the marginal
buyer were a domestic bank anticipating to be bailed out, bond prices would not fall as much, so that could
dampen the doom loop (and perhaps provide a reason for financial repression).
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− I(s), 0}dπ(s) are not pinned down by consol-
idated positions.
No Supervisory Leniency. In this basic model, it is never optimal for the supervisor to
engage in supervisory leniency.
Proposition 2 (No Supervisory Leniency). As long as there are bailouts, it is never optimal for the
supervisor to engage in supervisory leniency and so r = r̄.
The proof of Proposition 2 uses the decompositionW0 = E0−R0 + C0 given in (8) taking
p0 as given. Supervisory leniency has four effects on welfare. First, it has an efficiency benefit
by reducing expected legacy debt repayments because it leads to more defaults. Second, it
has an efficiency cost by increasing expected default costs. Under our maintained assump-
tion of large default costs, the net effect of these first two effects is a reduction in efficiency E0.
Third, it has a distributive cost by increasing the rents extracted by bankers at the expense of
consumers because of bank bailouts, increasingR0. Fourth, it has a distributive cost because
bankers must now purchase debt from foreign legacy creditors at a price which exceeds ex-
pected repayment, reducing C0. Overall, the total effect of supervisory leniency is therefore
a reduction in welfare.
Remark: While the logic of Proposition 2 makes good economic sense, Sovereigns usually
do not seem to limit their banks’ abilities to hold their debt in times of distress. The next
section’s task will be to shed light on why this may be so.
First-Best Frictionless Supervision. Let us now investigate a related but different question.
We perform a comparative statics exercise with respect to supervisory capability r̄. This differs
from the regulatory intensity (the choice of r) question because the Sovereign internalizes its
impact on the date-0 price of debt p0 when choosing supervisory capacity r̄, but not when
choosing actual supervision r ≤ r̄ given supervisory capacity r̄. We perform this comparative
static exercise under two alternative assumptions: (a) that the face value of debt B0 is kept
constant; or (b) that the market value of debt p0B0 is kept constant. Which of (a) or (b) is
most reasonable depends on the situation one is trying to capture. One could argue that (b)
is more relevant for long-run comparisons across countries or supervisory regimes, while (a)
is more relevant to analyze short-run responses to unanticipated shocks or situations as in
Bulow-Rogoff (1988,1991) (see below).
The occurrence of default is minimized when r̄ = Ī so that bankers can always finance
their investment I(s) without requiring a bailout.22 Reducing r̄ below Ī on the other hand
22The welfare of bankers as well as total welfare are then independent of the amount b∗0 ≥ r̄ invested in
foreign bonds above the floor r̄, where we have used the fact that r = r̄.
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would reduce welfare. Indeed, the effect of reducing r̄ below Ī on welfare can be analyzed
using the decomposition W0 = E0 −R0 given in (4). First, if the face value of debt is kept
constant, it has an efficiency benefit by reducing expected repayments to foreigners because
it leads to more defaults (this efficiency benefit is inexistent if instead the market value of
debt is kept constant). Second, it has an efficiency cost by increasing expected default costs.
Under our maintained assumption of large default costs, the net effect is a reduction in E0.
Third, it has a distributive cost by increasing the rents extracted by bankers at the expense
of consumers because of bank bailouts. This increases R0. Overall, the total effect of lower
supervisory capability is therefore a reduction in welfare.
Proposition 3 (First-Best Frictionless Supervisory Capability). Setting r̄ = Ī, if feasible, maxi-
mizes ex-ante welfareW0.
The optimal frictionless first-best supervision actually prevents the feedback loop from
occurring in the first place by prohibiting domestic banks from holding domestic sovereign
debt to an extent that could make them illiquid. We have already discussed in Section 2.1
some reasons why we might observe suboptimal supervision r̄ < Ī, creating the possibility
of the feedback loops that are the focus of this paper. These considerations lead us to adopt
a pragmatic position and treat r̄ as a parameter.
Remark: The rationale for supervision uncovered in Propositions 2 and 3 has a macro-
prudential dimension. Indeed, the benefits of liquidity regulation depend on the risk taken
by the banking system as a whole. The more risk the banking system as whole takes, the
riskier domestic sovereign debt, and the higher the probability of a sovereign default. More-
over, as we show in Appendix A.3, higher aggregate risk taking also increases the incentives
risk taking by individual banks. The benefits of tighter supervision therefore have a clear
macroeconomic dimension, over and above their usual microeconomic one.
Remark: We will encounter throughout the paper a number of corner solutions. These are
the result of deliberate modeling choices: To simplify the exposition and isolate the funda-
mental forces at work, we have chosen to keep our model very parsimonious and to build in
a lot of linearity, leading to such corner solutions. The qualitative insights that we obtain do
not depend on corner solutions. For example, if we had introduced convex costs of super-
visory intensity and capability, then the no-supervisory leniency and maximal supervisory
capability results in Propositions 2 and 3 would have taken less extreme forms.
3.2 Connection to Bulow-Rogoff’s Debt Buybacks Result
Engaging in supervisory leniency, or lowering supervisory capacity triggers a form of debt
buyback of domestic sovereign debt by domestic banks. Propositions 2 and 3 establish that
such debt buybacks are undesirable, ex post and ex ante respectively.
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It is interesting to relate these results to the well-known result by Bulow-Rogoff (1988,
1991) that debt buybacks are undesirable. Their result is derived in a model that has similari-
ties and differences with ours. Like our model, their model has mechanical defaults (defaults
occur if the Sovereign cannot pay). Unlike our model, their model has zero default costs, and
it has only consumers but no banks and no bailouts. We now proceed to unpack the respec-
tive roles of these different assumptions. As we shall see, our results, and the logic behind
them, are very different from those of Bulow-Rogoff. But in order to maximize the compa-
rability with their results, we focus on the choice of regulatory capacity as in Proposition 3,
where there is an effect of the associated debt buyback on the date-0 price of debt which is
internalized by the Sovereign. For the same reason, we focus on the case where the face value
of debt, rather than the market value of debt, is kept constant. We rely on the decomposition
W0 = E0 −R0 given in (4).
The essence of the Bulow-Rogoff argument is as follows. Consider the same environment
as in our model, but with no default costs (Φ = 0) and no banks (A = Ī = 0). A debt buyback
by the Sovereign which reduces debt from B0 to B0 + ∆B0 with ∆B0 < 0, financed by taxes
on consumers at date 0, results in new no-default states ∆ND = {(s, E)|E ∈ [B0 + ∆B0, B0)}.
This leads to a positive change in foreign welfare
∆W∗0 = E0[B01{(s,E)∈∆ND}] > 0
and a negative change in domestic welfare
∆W0 = ∆E0 = −∆W∗0 < 0.
Basically, the game is zero sum between domestics and foreigners. Foreigners gain from
the buyback because it reduces the amount of outstanding debt, increases the probability of
repayment, and increases the date-0 price of debt.23 The gains of foreigners are at the expense
of domestics, who end up repaying more often. A debt buyback is therefore a bad deal.
Now introduce default costs (Φ > 0), but continue to assume that there are only con-
sumers but no banks (A = Ī = 0). Repeating the same exercise, we still have
∆W∗0 = E0[B01{(s,E)∈∆ND}] > 0
but we now have
∆W0 = ∆E0 = E0[(Φ− B0)1{(s,E)∈∆ND}] = E0[Φ1{(s,E)∈∆ND}]− ∆W∗0 > −∆W∗0 .
23Foreigners are indifferent between selling and holding on to domestic sovereign debt. Those who sell
benefit from the increased date-0 price. Those who do not sell benefit from the reduced probability of default.
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Because of default costs, the game between domestics and foreigners is not zero sum any-
more: Debt buybacks have efficiency gains because they economize on default costs. With
large enough default costs, debt buybacks are a good deal: Both domestics and foreigners
gain from a debt buyback.
Now introduce not only default costs (Φ > 0) but also banks (A > 0 and Ī > 0) to get
our model as analyzed in Proposition 3. Start from r̄ = Ī and lower supervisory capacity to
r̄ + ∆r̄ with ∆r̄ < 0. This leads to a debt buyback of domestic sovereign debt by domestic
banks. Despite the presence of default costs, this reduces domestic welfare. Indeed, the debt
buyback leads to greater bank bailouts ∆X(s) ≥ 0 and additional post-bailout debt ∆B1(s) ≥
0. As a result, there are new default states ∆D = {(s, E)|E ∈ [B1(s), B1(s) + ∆B1(s))} instead
of new no-default states. This reduces foreign welfare
∆W∗0 = −E0[B01{(s,E)∈∆D(s)}] ≤ 0
and domestic welfare
∆W0 = ∆E0 − ∆R0 = −E0[(Φ− B0)1{(s,E)∈∆D(s)}]− (1− βB)E0[∆X(s)] ≤ 0.
The reduction in domestic welfare arises from efficiency costs in the form of larger expected
default costs net of debt repayments ∆E0 = −E0[(Φ− B0)1{(s,E)∈∆D(s)}] ≤ 0, and from dis-
tributive costs in the form of extra rents extracted by bankers at the expense of consumers
∆R0 = (1− βB)E0[∆X(s)] ≥ 0.
Like in Bulow-Rogoff, in our setting, debt buybacks reduce domestic welfare. But there
are important differences. First, in our setting and unlike in theirs, there are default costs.
Second, in our setting and unlike in theirs, it matters which institutions perform the debt
buyback: Debt buybacks by the Sovereign can improve domestic welfare, but debt buybacks
by banks reduce domestic welfare. Third, in our setting and unlike in theirs, debt buybacks
by banks reduce foreign welfare as well as domestic welfare.
The takeaway from this discussion is that balance sheet consolidation leads to misleading
conclusions. In the presence of large default costs, debt buybacks are a good deal, but not if
they occur through domestic banks. This result, and the logic behind it, are fundamentally
different from those of Bulow-Rogoff. They can only be uncovered in a setting with enough




We now unveil a first driver of re-nationalization of portfolios in bad times: When banks
have some discretion with regards to their level of diversification (which was not the case
so far, as their choice was bound to match the regulatory intensity r), then their incentive
not to diversify is higher when bad news, say about fiscal capacity, accrues. The intuition
is that bad news raises the value of the bailout put, and so banks are more willing to incur
costs to reduce their diversification (for example by concealing more their exposure to the
Sovereign). More precisely, we assume (for the sake of this section only) that a bank’s ability
to engage in risk taking depends not only on supervisory policy, but also on its own ability
to make its balance sheet opaque.
Taking the supervisory effort r as a given, assume that each bank, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1],
can select its individual level of foreign holdings b∗0(i) at non-monetary cost Ψ(r − b∗0(i)),
with Ψ(x) = 0 for x ≤ 0 and Ψ(x) a strictly increasing and convex function for x ≥ 0. We
look for a symmetric equilibrium in which all banks choose the same b∗0(i) = b
∗
0 for all i. For
simplicity, we focus on fiscal shocks and assume that I(s) = Ī is independent of s. We also
assume that A = Ī. It is easy to see that the absence of supervisory leniency r = r̄ extends to
the setting of this section. We therefore make use of the fact that r = r̄ throughout.
We consider shifts F(E|s; ξ) and f (E|s; ξ) in the distribution of fiscal capacity E given the
state of the world s indexed by the parameter ξ (these shifts are public information at date
0 and hence affect p0). We perform the local comparative statics around an initial value ξ0.
All equilibrium variables are indexed by ξ, and we consider partial and total derivatives of
these variables with respect to ξ at ξ = ξ0.
We say that the shifter ξ is risk-increasing at ξ0 if
∂F(B1(s;ξ)|s;ξ)
∂ξ |ξ=ξ0 > 0 for s < s̃(ξ0) and
∂F(B1(s;ξ)|s;ξ)
∂ξ |ξ=ξ0 = 0 for s ≥ s̃(ξ0). Concretely, this means that an infinitesimal increase in
ξ leads to an adverse shift in the distribution of fiscal capacity (in the first-order stochastic
dominance sense) for states s < s̃(ξ0) in which there is a bailout, but not for states s ≥ s̃(ξ0)
for which there is no bailout.
To lighten the notation, whenever this cannot lead to any confusion, we leave the depen-
dence of all variables on ξ implicit. We also omit that the derivatives are taken at ξ = ξ0.





Proposition 4 (Bad Fiscal Shocks and Debt Re-nationalization). Suppose that I(s) = Ī is inde-
pendent of s, that A = Ī, and that the shifter ξ is risk-increasing. Then an adverse shock in the form
of an increase in ξ leads to a reduction in the price of debt (a reduction in p0) and an increase in the
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When the shifter ξ is risk-increasing, an infinitesimal increase in ξ does not change the
date-1 price of debt p1(s) in the no-bailout states s ≥ s̃ , but decreases it on average in
the bailout states s < s̃, leading to a decrease in the date-0 price of debt p0. As a result
the returns to holding domestic sovereign debt for a bank p1(s)p0 increase in the no-bailout
states, and are unchanged in the bailout states because the bank is bailed out. This increases
the attractiveness of risky domestic sovereign debt for domestic banks, and leads banks to
increase their exposure A− b∗0 to risky domestic sovereign debt and decrease their exposure
b∗0 to safe foreign sovereign debt. This in turn increases the size of bailouts on average in
bailout states, further reduces the date-1 price of debt p1(s) on average in these states and
the date-0 price of debt p0, further increases the attractiveness of risky domestic sovereign
debt for domestic banks, leading banks to further increase their exposure A − b∗0 to risky
domestic sovereign debt and to decrease their exposure b∗0 to safe foreign sovereign debt, etc.
ad infinitum. This feedback loop amplifies the initial effect on p0, p1(s), and b∗0 through a
multiplier effect.24
In Appendix A.3, we show that the introduction of a supervisory evasion cost function
adds yet another insight: supervisory evasion activities are complements. Intuitively, in-
creased risk-taking by other banks makes domestic sovereign bonds riskier and increases the
value of the bailout put, inducing individual banks to exert further efforts to take on more
sovereign debt. There is more amplification, the stronger are the strategic complementari-
ties, as measured by the inverse of the curvature Ψ′′(r̄− b∗0) of the supervisory evasion cost
function, which determines the slope of an individual bank’s best response to the portfolios
of other banks.
Proposition 4 defines a precise sense in which bad fiscal news can lead to debt re-nationalization.
It offers a possible explanation for the well-known fact that such a re-nationalization of
sovereign debt was observed in Europe as the recent crisis intensified.25 Here this is due
to the imperfect ability of the Sovereign to limit the exposure of banks to domestic sovereign










































25See Broner et al (2013), Genaioli et al (2014,a,b) and Uhlig (2014) for careful documentations.
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default risk through supervision. The rationale for re-nationalization is based on the idea
that risky domestic sovereign bonds are more attractive to banks in bad times.26
We return to debt re-nationalization in Section 4.1, where we propose a different mecha-
nism, which relies on the desirability for the Sovereign to allow banks to load up on domestic
sovereign default risk in order to push legacy creditors to forgive more debt or foreign coun-
tries to extend sovereign transfers, even if the Sovereign can perfectly supervise the banking
system.
4 Lax Supervision, Debt Re-Nationalization, and Banking Unions
This section provides two different reasons why supervision is likely to be lax when conse-
quences are borne in part by foreigners. As lax supervision ultimately hurts either the coun-
try itself or foreigners, we will then discuss the implications of our analysis for the existence
of a banking union, in the sense of a single supervisory mechanism.
We first modify the basic model by introducing the possibility of debt forgiveness at
date 1, and show that it gives rise to an incentive for lax supervision whereby the domestic
Sovereign, anticipating concessions from legacy creditors, turns a blind eye when its banks
take on domestic sovereign risk exposures and sets r < r̄, leading to debt re-nationalization.
If the ex-post leniency of domestic supervisors is anticipated ex ante at the time of sovereign
debt issuance, then it is priced in the form of higher spreads. There is an externality on for-
eign investors only ex post. The Sovereign is better off committing ex ante to a tough ex-post
supervisory stance r = r̄, but is tempted to relax it ex post to r < r̄. The Sovereign, who
lacks commitment, benefits from relinquishing its supervisory powers to a supranational
supervisor by joining a banking union.
We then assume away debt forgiveness, and introduce instead the possibility that for-
eign countries incur a collateral damage when the domestic country defaults. At the inter-
mediate date, they can make a transfer to the country. This transfer is shown to increase
with the home bias (in the region in which there are bailouts). Thus supervisory leniency is
costly to the country as transfers from abroad increase. Supervision might therefore be le-
nient and lead to debt re-nationalization. Delegation to a supranational supervisor combined
with a commitment to sufficient ex-post transfers improves total (domestic and foreign) wel-
fare by internalizing an externality of domestic supervision on foreign countries. This pro-
vides an externality-based rationale for banking unions where, in contrast with the previous
commitment-based rationale, requires both delegated supervision and transfer commitments.
To be certain, the rationale for a banking union can also be found in externalities unrelated
26In bad times monitoring banks is also more attractive to the supervisor. Proposition 4 nonetheless would
still hold as long as the supervisory capability does not adjust rapidly with the state of nature.
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to debt forgiveness or transfers from foreign countries. A lax supervision may hurt foreigners
because foreign banks hold domestic sovereign debt27 or have exposures to domestic banks,
because domestic banks have subsidiaries abroad that will be shut down or downsized in
case of difficulties (presumably before the domestic entity), etc. For example, in Appendix
B.4, we develop a model with foreign banks in the foreign safe country which can invest
in domestic risky sovereign bonds and show that this builds a case for a banking union to
internalize externalities of domestic supervision on foreign banks through the riskiness of
domestic sovereign debt.
4.1 Debt Forgiveness
We model date-1 debt forgiveness as follows. We assume that after the state of nature s is
observed at date 1, bondholders can forgive some of the legacy debt to an arbitrary B̃0 ≤ B0,
before the Sovereign undertakes the bailout policy. 28 When some debt forgiveness can im-
prove the outcome of the legacy creditors, a mutually beneficial negotiation can take place
between legacy creditors and the Sovereign. The outcome of the negotiation depends on the
ability of legacy creditors to coordinate and on the distribution of bargaining power between
legacy creditors and the Sovereign.29 We assume that legacy creditors are able to coordinate,
and have all the bargaining power: They collectively make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the
Sovereign. Bondholders factor in the subsequent bailout when choosing how much to for-
give. Banks either have no stake (i.e. when they will receive a bailout) or have perfectly
congruent interests with international investors (when not bailed out). So we can take the
decision of bondholders to be that of international investors.
Legacy creditors engage in debt forgiveness B̄0(s) < B0 when legacy debt B0 is on the
wrong side of the legacy creditors’ Laffer curve p1(s; B̃0)B̃0, where B̄0(s) is the peak of the legacy
creditors’ Laffer curve. We have introduced the notation p1(s; B̃0) = 1 − F(B1(s; B̃0)|s) to
make the dependence of the date-1 price of debt on the post-debt-forgiveness debt stock B̃0
explicit.30,31
A remarkable property is that debt forgiveness, when it happens, leads to a final debt
27See for example the exposure of French and German banks to Greek sovereign debt.
28Would the foreign investors not want to combine the debt write-down with a restriction on the amount of
new debt that can be issued so as to avoid subsequent debt dilution when the bailout is operated? This would
actually make no difference: We have assumed that βI(s) is sufficiently large that the Sovereign wants to bail
out the banks no matter what. Such a covenant would therefore not lead to an agreement, and so the investors
might as well forgive debt without including such a covenant.
29Of course organizing debt forgiveness requires coordination among legacy creditors to neutralize the free-
riding incentives of individual creditors.
30We assume that banks do not free-ride on the renegotiation. All our results would go through if we assumed
instead that banks could perfectly free-ride on the renegotiation.
31The possibility of debt forgiveness does not rely on the presence of banks or the existence of bailouts. See
Hatchondo-Martinez-Sosa Padilla (2014) for a recent analysis.
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B1(s) at the peak B̄1(s) of the Laffer curve [1− F(B1|s)]B1. This is obvious when there is no
bailout; then B1(s) = B̃0 and so international investors maximize [1− F(B̃0|s)]B̃0, leading to
B1(s) = B̄1(s). Suppose, next, that there is a bailout: B1 = B1(s) satisfies
[1− F(B1|s)](B1 − B̃0) = X(s),
where X(s) is an affine function of [1− F(B1|s)]B̃0 (the banks’ sovereign debt holdings have
shrunk by a factor B̃0B0 and their price is [1− F(B1|s)]).
32 The above bailout equation therefore
shows that what the legacy creditors attempt to maximize, [1− F(B1|s)]B̃0, is an increasing
(and affine) function of [1− F(B1|s)]B1, which explains why final debt is still at the peak of
the Laffer curve (see the proof of Proposition 5 for a more formal account).
Proposition 5 (Legacy Creditors’ Laffer Curve and Debt Forgiveness). Consider the equilib-
rium for a given fixed diversification requirement r ∈ [0, r̄].33 Suppose that there are states s where
debt forgiveness takes place so that B0(s) = B̄0(s) and focus on these states. Then the amount of
date-1 debt after debt forgiveness and issuance associated with the peak B̄0(s) of the legacy creditors’
Laffer curve is at the peak B̄1(s) of the Laffer curve [1− F(B1|s)]B1. In addition, B̄0(s) is increasing
in s so that worse states are associated with more debt forgiveness.
The possibility of debt forgiveness can make it optimal for the Sovereign to engage in
supervisory leniency r < r̄ so as to extract larger concessions from legacy creditors. Another
way to put this is that the Sovereign may have incentives to let its domestic banks load up
on domestic sovereign debt in order to extract concessions from legacy creditors.
Assume for simplicity that I(s) is independent of s and that A = Ī, and consider the
equilibrium for a given fixed diversification requirement r ∈ [0, r̄]. All equilibrium variables
are indexed by r but we leave this dependence implicit to make the notation lighter. Suppose
first that if there is no bailout, then there is debt forgiveness if and only s ≤ s̄, where the





Assuming that there is debt forgiveness, there is a bailout if and only if s ≤ s̃, where, using







32In this case, X(s) is given by X(s) = I(s)− r− A−rp0B0 B̃0[1− F(B1(s)|s)].
33This means that we consider an equilibrium of a modified policy game where the supervisor is forced to
choose the diversification requirement r. We will later consider the equilibrium choice of r.
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where B̄1(s) is the peak of the Laffer curve with B̄1(s)
f (B̄1(s)|s)
1−F(B̄1(s)|s)
= 1. If these two thresholds
are ordered s̃ < s̄, then it is possible to prove that there is a bailout if and only if s ≤ s̃, and
debt forgiveness if and only if s ≤ s̄.34 This configuration is guaranteed to arise in bad times
when B0 is large.35 We then say that the equilibrium is bailout-shifting to capture the idea that
under this configuration, the cost of bailouts is entirely shifted to foreigners through debt
forgiveness.
Proposition 6 (Debt Forgiveness, Strategic Supervisory Leniency, and Debt Re-Nationaliza-
tion). Suppose that I(s) is independent of s, that A = Ī, and that the distribution π(s) admits a
continuous density dπ(s) = Π(s)ds. Consider the equilibrium with no supervisory leniency r = r̄.
Assume that for this maximal diversification requirement, the equilibrium is bailout-shifting. Then for
any lower diversification requirement r ≤ r̄, the equilibrium with a fixed diversification requirement
r is bailout shifting. Moreover, the only equilibrium with endogenous supervisory leniency features
maximal supervisory leniency r = 0.
This proposition provides conditions under which it is optimal for the Sovereign to en-
gage in full supervisory leniency and allow domestic banks to take only domestic debt, and
to risk needing a bailout when the Sovereign experiences a bad fiscal shock. For a given p0
and B0, relaxing supervision allows the Sovereign to extract more concessions from legacy
creditors.36 Domestic consumers are left as well off because they are entirely shielded from
the extra cost of bailouts, which are completely covered by extra debt forgiveness by for-
eigners, and because expected default costs are unchanged. Bankers are strictly better off in
the no-bailout states because they hold more domestic sovereign bonds which have a higher
return than safe foreign bonds in these states, and they are as well off in the bailout states
because they are bailed out.37
34We only need to verify that the condition for no bailout if there is no debt forgiveness 1−F(B0|s)p0 ≥ 1 holds
for s > s̄, and that the condition for debt forgiveness if there is a bailout f (B1(s)|s)1−F(B1(s)|s)B0[1+
A−r
p1(s)B0
(1− p1(s)p0 )] ≥ 1













≥ 1. The second part follows immediately from the observation that s ≤ s̃ implies that s < s̄ and hence




35That s̃ < s̄ for B0 large enough can be seen as follows. As B0 grows, s̄ converges to the upper
bound smax ∈ R̄ of the support of the s distribution. At the same time, p0B0 converges to the constant∫
B̄0(s)[1− F(B̄1(s)|s)]π(s)ds, which implies that s̃ converges to the interior point of the support of the s distri-
bution defined implicitly by B̄1(s̃)[1−F(B̄1(s̃)|s̃)]∫ B̄0(s)[1−F(B̄1(s)|s)]π(s)ds = 1.
36We refer the reader to Appendix C.3 for an illustration of Proposition 6 in the context of a simple example
which can be solved in closed form.
37It is interesting to analyze how our results are affected when some banks already hold domestic sovereign
debt at the time when the Sovereign decides its supervisory stance r. To do so, consider an overlapping gener-
ations extension of the model where a separate “generation −1 ” of banks with mass m−1 is introduced. Each
of these banks has net worth A−1 + p0b0,−1 at date 0, where b0,−1 is their domestic sovereign debt holdings and
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In terms of the decomposition W0 = E0 − R0 + C0 given in (8) and adjusted for debt
forgiveness, supervisory leniency (lowering r) has the following effects given p0 and B0. First,
it has an efficiency benefit because it leads to more debt forgiveness but not more defaults,
increasing E0. Second, is has a distributive cost because it increases the rents extracted by
bankers because of bailouts, increasing R0. Third, it has another distributive cost because
bankers now purchase debt from legacy creditors at a price which is higher than the expected
repayment (net of debt forgiveness), decreasing C0. Proposition 6 shows that the benefit
outweighs the costs.
Proposition 6 offers a possible explanation for the well-known fact that a re-nationalization
of sovereign debt was observed in Europe as the recent crisis intensified. In Section 3.3, we
proposed a different mechanism based on the imperfect ability of the Sovereign to limit the
exposure of banks to domestic sovereign default risk through supervision.
Remark: The maximal supervisory leniency result is striking, but relies on the bailout shift-
ing assumption, which does not hold for B0 small. The more general conclusion is that we
should expect some supervisory leniency, and more so in times of fiscal stress. We refer the
reader to Appendix C.3 where we develop an illustrative example where the bailout shifting
assumption does not hold uniformly, and where there is some but not necessarily maximal
supervisory leniency.
Remark: Excessively lax supervision can pre-date the crisis. Indeed, our formalism allows for
agency costs within the Sovereign, as the supervisor may put excessive (relative to the pop-
ulation) weight on bankers’ welfare or too much weight on real estate lending for instance.
Proposition 6 then means that the prospect of debt forgiveness may make supervisors even
more lenient than they would be otherwise.
We build on this analysis and put ourselves under the hypotheses of Proposition 6. We
show that foreign investors are made worse off by the relaxation of supervision of domestic
banks by the domestic Sovereign: Once they have lent, their welfare is maximized by a tough
supervision r = r̄. Of course their welfare is adversely impacted only if this relaxation of
supervision is not anticipated at the time of the debt issuance, otherwise it is fully priced in.
Interestingly, in this latter case, domestic welfare can be increased by a tough supervision
r = r̄. But this requires commitment on the part of the domestic Sovereign not to relax
A−1 includes holdings of safe foreign sovereign bonds. Each of these banks must reinvest I−1 at date 0 in order
to get the payoff ρ1,−1 (otherwise it gets 0) at date 1 in which case stakeholders also get βI−1 (otherwise they get
0). At date 0, the Sovereign engages in a total bailout m−1 max{I−1 − (A−1 + p0b0,−1), 0} of “generation -1 ”
banks, which is financed either by using up some of the saved-up proceeds of the initial legacy debt issuance,
or by taxing a separate “generation -1” of consumers which carry a welfare weight of 1. The important point
is that because the choice of r is not observable, it does not change the price p0, and hence does not change the
size of the bailout of “generation -1” banks. Therefore Proposition 6 still holds in this extended model: the fact
that some domestic banks already hold domestic sovereign debt does not change the incentives to engage in
supervisory leniency.
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supervision after the debt is issued.
One of the important aspects of banking unions is the transfer of banking supervision
from the national to the supranational level. Such a transfer weakens or removes the tempta-
tion of Sovereigns to strategically allow their banks to load up on domestic sovereign bonds
to extract larger concessions from legacy creditors. It can therefore facilitate the implemen-
tation of the commitment solution with a high diversification requirement r = r̄. This is
because the international supervisor’s objective function naturally puts more weight on in-
ternational investors than the domestic Sovereign, making it less tempting to relax supervi-
sion ex post.38,39




0 = p0B0 at
date 0 when the effective diversification requirement is r′ = 0 as the debt level B0 when the
effective diversification requirement is r = r̄. And compare the equilibrium with a fixed
diversification requirement r = r̄ and debt level B0 to the equilibrium with endogenous
supervisory leniency r′ = 0 and debt level B′0. We denote all variables associated with the
latter equilibrium with prime superscripts. We make the additional assumption that the
former equilibrium is “bailout-shifting” with s̃ < s̄.40
We use the decompositionW0 = E0 −R0 given in (4) adjusted for debt forgiveness. We
show below thatW ′0 = E ′0 −R′0 < W0 = E0 −R0. This occurs for two reasons. First, with





0 = p0B0. The increase in legacy debt increases default occurrences, increases ex-
pected default costs, and reduces welfare as captured by E ′0 < E0. Second, bankers collect
bigger rents. The rents of bankers only come at the expense of consumers because super-
visory leniency is fully priced in by foreign investors at the issuance stage. The increase in
the rents of bankers therefore decreases the welfare of consumers one for one. Since con-
sumers carry a higher welfare weight than banks, this also reduces welfare as captured by
R′0 > R0.41
Proposition 7 (Banking Union). Consider the same hypotheses as in Proposition 6. If the relaxation
of supervision is fully priced in by international investors at the time of the issuance of date-0 debt,
38Another possibility is that the international supervisor has a better ability to commit to regulation than the
domestic Sovereign, perhaps because it is dealing with more countries and more banks and can hence build a
reputation more easily.
39Foreigners are powerless to resist the re-nationalization of domestic debt unless they are able to coordinate
not to sell their domestic sovereign bonds to domestic banks, which unlike debt relief negotiations, seems to
have few real world counterparts. To the extent that foreign investors are located in different countries, foreign
national supervisors would also need to coordinate in order to facilitate this outcome.
40The difference with Proposition 6 is that B′0 6= B0. Under this assumption, one can show that B′0 > B0,
s̃′ = s̃ and that s̄′ > s̄, so that s̃′ < s̄′ the equilibrium with endogenous supervisory leniency r′ = 0 and debt B′0
is “bailout-shifting”.
41We refer the reader to Appendix C.4 for an illustration of Proposition 7 in the context of a simple example
which can be solved in closed form.
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then the domestic Sovereign faces a time-inconsistency cost. It is made better off by promising not
to engage in supervisory leniency and to set a high effective diversification requirement r = r̄ before
issuing debt at date 0, but it is tempted to relax this requirement after the issuance and lower r below
r̄. A banking union whereby supervision is delegated to a supranational supervisor who puts the same
welfare weight on international investors and domestic consumers (instead of zero weight on inter-
national investors for the domestic supervisor) removes this temptation, implements the commitment
solution, and improves domestic welfare and total (domestic and foreign) welfare.
4.2 Country Solidarity and International Transfers
Instead of investors forgiving debt as their holdings lie on the wrong side of the legacy cred-
itors’ Laffer curve, we could have neighboring countries providing liquidity assistance as
they know that they will be impacted by the economic and geopolitical consequences of a
future default. To capture this, we assume that the neighboring countries incur spillover cost
Γ > 0 in case of default and can operate a (state-contingent) transfer T ≥ 0 to the Sovereign
at date 1 (see e.g. Tirole 2015); by contrast, we assume away debt forgiveness by the private
sector, either because of lack of coordination or because debt holdings are on the right side
of the legacy creditors’ Laffer curve.
We only summarize our analysis and refer the reader to Appendix A.7 for a detailed
treatment. For simplicity, we assume throughout that I(s) = Ī = A and that F(E|s) =
F(E− s) with f decreasing. The debt issuance equation is: [1− F(B1|s)](B1− B0) = X(s)− T




When Γ is large enough, the equilibrium given the fixed diversification requirement r = 0
is bailout shifting in the sense that, as in Section 4.1, there exist two thresholds s̃ < s̄ such that
bailouts occur only when transfers are strictly positive. There is then an additional threshold
˜̃s < s̃ such that: For s ≥ s̄, there are neither transfers nor bailouts (T(s) = X(s) = 0), and
date-1 debt is equal to legacy debt (B1(s) = B0); for s̃ ≤ s < s̄, there are transfers (T(s) > 0)
but no bailouts (X(s) = 0), and date-1 debt B1(s) < B0 increases less than one for one with
s; for ˜̃s ≤ s < s̃, there are transfers (T(s) > 0) and still no bailouts (X(s) = 0), but date-1
debt B1(s) < B0 increases one for one with s so as to prevent bailouts; and for s < ˜̃s, there are
transfers (T(s) > 0) and bailouts (X(s) > 0), and date-1 debt B1(s) < B0 increases less than
one for one with s.
The threshold s̃ is decreasing in r ≤ r̄ and s̄ is independent of r ≤ r̄, so that the equilibrium
given the fixed diversification requirement r remains bailout shifting for all r ≤ r̄. For a
42Note that T can be used at the discretion of the Sovereign. Since funds are fungible, in the bailout region,
one can think of transfers as either deployed towards the rescue of banks or towards the reduction of debt.
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given p0 and B0, B1(s) is independent of r when s > ˜̃s, but is strictly increasing in r when
s < ˜̃s. This last property is key, and means that for a given p0 and B0, a lower r leads to an
increase in transfer T(s) that exceeds the increase in required bailout X(s), leading to a lower
debt burden B1(s). This arises because the doom loop, which is stronger when r is lower,
makes transfers more attractive at the margin for foreigners at any level B1(s) by magnifying
the reduction in the probability of default resulting from a transfers. As a result, the only
equilibrium features maximal supervisory leniency r = 0.
Proposition 8. (Lax Supervision and Re-Nationalization) Assume that there is no debt forgiveness,
but that other countries incur collateral damage Γ > 0 when the country defaults at date 2 and
that they can operate a transfer T(s) ≥ 0 of their choice at date 1. Assume that I(s) = Ī = A,
that F(E|s) = F(E− s) with f decreasing, and that the equilibrium given the fixed diversification
requirement r = r̄ is bailout shifting, which is guaranteed to hold if Γ is large enough. Then for
all r ≤ r̄, the equilibrium given the fixed diversification requirement r is bailout shifting. The only
equilibrium with endogenous supervisory leniency features maximal supervisory leniency r = 0.
We now discuss the benefits of banking unions. Under the assumptions of the proposition,
the ex-post state-contingent transfers of foreign countries provide powerful insurance to the
Sovereign. Ex-post debt B1(s) is always weakly lower than legacy debt B0, and strictly so
when transfers are strictly positive. This in turn increases the date-0 price of debt p0, and
allows the Sovereign the raise the same amount of revenues p0B0 by issuing less debt B0,
which in turn reduces the occurrence of defaults and the associated collateral damage. But
at date 1, these beneficial effects of solidarity on p0 and B0 are not internalized by foreigners.
It is therefore possible that tougher supervision, by decreasing the incentives for foreigners
to provide transfers ex post, actually decrease both domestic and foreign welfare. Relying on
lax supervision however, is inefficient since it leads to higher rents for bankers.
Starting from a status quo of no banking union and lax supervision, foreigners can im-
prove their welfare while keeping the welfare of the domestic country constant by making
the following take-it-or-leave-it offer to the domestic Sovereign. Suppose that the Sovereign
puts arbitrarily small weight on bankers so that βB w 0. In exchange for the delegation of su-
pervision to a central supervisor who puts full weight on foreigners and hence implements
tough supervision r = r̄, foreigners commit to providing a sufficient amount of transfers
to lead to the same ex-post debt B1(s) as the one that prevails under the status quo. These
promised state-contingent transfers are minimal transfers in the sense that foreigners can
always provide larger, but not smaller, transfers ex post. If the Sovereign accepts the offer,
then the ex-post transfers coincide with the promised state-contingent transfers, debt prices
p0 and p1(s) are the same as under the status quo, and the same amount of debt B0 is issued
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at date 0.43 With no weight on bankers, domestic welfare is unchanged, but the welfare of
bankers is reduced and foreign welfare increased by the same amount.
Proposition 9. (Banking Union) Under the hypotheses of Proposition 8, even in the absence of
debt forgiveness, supervisory leniency may occur, as it allows the domestic Sovereign to extract ex-
post transfers from the foreign country. Lax domestic supervision reduces foreign welfare, which is
not internalized by the domestic supervisor (in fact it is exploited by the domestic supervisor). A
banking union whereby supervision is delegated to a supranational supervisor who puts full weight
on foreign consumers (instead of zero weight on foreign consumers for the domestic supervisor) and
a commitment by foreigners to a set of minimal ex-post transfers leads to maximal supervision r = r̄
and improves both domestic and foreign welfare as long as βB is not too large.
Remark: Compared with the status quo of no banking union and lax supervision, it is
sometimes also possible to increase foreign welfare and domestic welfare by only commit-
ting to a set of minimal ex-post transfers, without imposing delegated supervision, but the
reverse is not true. However, it is always possible to further increase foreign welfare while
keeping domestic welfare weakly higher than at the status quo by jointly committing to a
set of minimal ex-post transfers and requiring delegated supervision. This emphasizes an
important complementarity between fiscal and prudential integration.
Remark: Transfers were assumed to be made to the Sovereign. But at date 1 and in bailout
states, public and bank monies are fungible: the Sovereign ends up making up for the banks’
shortfall. So transfers could alternatively be made to banks. Political economy and other
reasons indeed led those transfers to be operated through the ECB acting as a lender-of-last-
resort, or more broadly through intra-European loans or transfers destined to contain the
effects of bank failures.
5 The Specialness of Sovereign Debt
We have assumed that the only way for domestic banks to take risk is by investing in risky
domestic sovereign bonds. Of course, in practice, banks can take risk by investing in a variety
of risky assets: risky foreign debt, equities, currencies, etc. Most of the results in Section 4
would go through in an alternative model with an alternative risky asset instead of domestic
sovereign debt: There would be incentives for lax supervision as well as a rationale for a
banking union in the presence of debt forgiveness or country solidarity.
43The promises are binding ex post for s < ˜̃s when there are both bailouts and transfers (foreigners would
choose lower transfers ex post absent the promise) but not for s ≥ ˜̃s.
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In this section, we argue that domestic sovereign debt has special attributes that make
it particularly relevant for these arguments, over and above the fact that banks are very ac-
tive in the sovereign debt market for a variety of historical and institutional reasons. First,
domestic sovereign debt gives rise to the doom loop, i.e. a two-way feedback loop between
banks and sovereigns while other risky assets do not. Second, the return on risky domes-
tic sovereign debt has a specific covariance structure with the liquidity shocks of domestic
banks and with the fiscal shocks of the domestic Sovereign; in particular, it is typically more
correlated with both than the return on risky foreign sovereign debt.
5.1 Doom Loop
For conciseness, we demonstrate the importance of the doom loop for the arguments of Sec-
tion 4 by providing two illustrative results, one regarding the benefits of banking unions
in the presence of debt forgiveness, and one regarding lax supervision in the presence of
country solidarity and international transfers.
We first put ourselves under the hypotheses of Proposition 7 regarding the benefits of
shared supervision in the presence of debt forgiveness. We consider a fictitious economy
where the only difference with the true economy is that banks can invest r in a safe foreign
bond and A − r in an exogenous risky asset with exogenous return R1(s) between dates 0
and 1, where r is the diversification requirement. We assume that the return on the risky
asset in the fictitious economy is the same as the post-debt-forgiveness return of the risky
domestic sovereign bond under the equilibrium of the true economy with a fixed diversifica-





. Then with a fixed diversification requirement
r̄, domestic sovereign bond prices p0 and p1(s), bailout requirements X(s), debt levels B0,
B0(s) and B1(s), and thresholds s̄ and s̃, are identical under the fictitious economy and under
the true economy.44
The two economies differ when supervision is relaxed (r < r̄) because the return on the
domestic sovereign debt changes via the doom loop, whereas the return of the exogenous
risky asset remains constant in the fictitious economy. Along the lines of Proposition 7, we
endogenize legacy debt by imposing that the revenues raised by the issuance of legacy debt
at date 0 remain constant (accounting for the fact that investors correctly anticipate the equi-
librium level of supervisory leniency r).
Proposition 10 (Doom Loop with Debt Forgiveness). Consider the same hypotheses as in Propo-
sition 7. The results in Proposition 7 hold both in the true economy with a doom loop where domestic
44The only tricky issue regards the equality of debt forgiveness B0(s) in both economies. It can easily be
verified by noting that the result that the peak of the legacy creditors’ Laffer curve leads to the peak of the
Laffer curve extends to the fictitious economy, and that the Laffer curve is the same in both economies.
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banks can invest in risky domestic sovereign bonds and in the fictitious economy with no doom loop
where domestic banks can invest in the exogenous risky asset: Without a banking union (in the sense
of shared supervision), there is maximal supervisory leniency r = 0; with a banking union, there is
no supervisory leniency r = r̄; and a banking union achieves positive welfare gains. However, the
welfare gains achieved by a banking union (in the sense of shared supervision) are magnified by the
doom loop: they are larger in the true economy than in the fictitious economy.
Denote by W0 = E0 − R0 and W ′0 = E ′0 − R′0 the welfare levels in the true economy
under shared supervision when r = r̄ and under domestic supervision when r = 0. De-











responding welfare levels in the fictitious economy. Under shared supervision, there is no
supervisory leniency, and the two economies are the same by construction, and so we have
W0 = W
f ictitious
0 . The welfare gains achieved by shared supervision are W0 −W ′0 > 0 and
W f ictitious0 −W
′ f ictitious
0 > 0 respectively.
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The intuition for magnification of the welfare gains from shared supervision by the doom
loop is that when supervision is relaxed: (1) The doom loop leads to bigger bailouts and more
ex-post debt forgiveness, which is priced-in ex ante by international investors, leading to
lower ex-ante domestic sovereign debt prices, higher legacy debt, and more defaults so that
E ′ f ictitious0 > E ′0; (2) the doom loop makes domestic sovereign debt riskier, leading to more









0 <W0 −W ′0.46
We now put ourselves under the hypotheses of Proposition 8 regarding lax supervision
in the absence of debt forgiveness but with country solidarity and international transfers.
45Similar arguments can be brought to bear on “austerity” and fiscal consolidation. To the extent that re-
sources can be used at date 0 to reduce debt, and that there is no banking union, then there is more to gain from

















B0, and s̃ = s̃′ = s̃ f ictitious = s̃′ f ictitious < s̄ < s̄′ f ictitious < s̄′. And moreover: for all s < s̃, B′1(s) = B
′ f ictitious
1 (s) =
B1(s), and B′0(s) < B
′ f ictitious
0 (s) < B0(s); for all s̃ = s̃
′ ≤ s ≤ s̄, B′0(s) = B
′ f ictitious
0 (s) = B0(s) = B1(s) = B
′
1(s) =
B′ f ictitious1 (s); for all s̄ < s ≤ s̄′ f ictitious, B1(s) = B0(s) = B0 < B′1(s) = B
′ f ictitious





B′ f ictitious0 < B
′
0; for all s̄
′ f ictitious ≤ s < s̄′, B1(s) = B0(s) = B0 < B
′ f ictitious
1 (s) = B
′ f ictitious







0; and for all s̄
′ < s, B1(s) = B0(s) = B0 < B
′ f ictitious
1 (s) = B
′ f ictitious















− 1, 0}π(s)ds and R′ f ictitious0 = −(1 −
βB)A
∫
{s≤s̃′ f ictitious}min{R1(s) − 1, 0}π(s)ds. We use s̃ = s̃
′ = s̃ f ictitious = s̃′ f ictitious. For all s < s̃, we
have B′1(s) = B1(s) and B
′














= R1(s). This implies thatR
′ f ictitious
0 < R′0.
Because B′1(s) ≥ B
′ f ictitious
1 (s) for all s with a strict inequality with positive probability, and because∫ ∫ ∞
B′1(s)
B′0(s) f (E|s)dEπ(s)ds =
∫ ∫ ∞
B′ f ictitious1 (s)
B′ f ictitious0 (s) f (E|s)dEπ(s)ds = p0B0, we have E
′ f ictitious
0 > E ′0.
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In the true economy, there is maximal supervisory leniency r = 0. We consider a fictitious
economy where we introduce an exogenous risky asset with the same payoff as domestic
sovereign bonds R1(s) =
p1(s)
p0
in the true economy. In the fictitious economy, banks can
invest in safe foreign sovereign bonds, risky domestic sovereign bonds, and the exogenous
risky asset. We assume that the Sovereign can perfectly control the portfolios of banks. This
means that we assume not only that supervisory capability is perfect so that r̄ = A, but also
that the Sovereign can perfectly determine the relative holdings of all assets.
Proposition 11 (Doom Loop with Country Solidarity). Consider the same hypotheses as in Propo-
sition 8. Then in the fictitious economy where banks can invest both in risky domestic sovereign bonds
and the exogenous risky asset, the Sovereign forces its banks to invest all their net worth A in risky
domestic sovereign bonds, and so to invest neither in safe foreign sovereign bonds nor in the exogenous
risky asset.
The intuition is that allowing banks to max out risky domestic sovereign bonds rather
than the exogenous risky asset leads to higher ex-post transfers T(s) by foreigners (in equi-
librium, banks themselves are actually indifferent between these two risky assets at the mar-
gin since they have the same returns). This is because as explained above, foreigners get a
bigger “bang for the buck” from a marginal transfer in terms of marginal reduction in the
probability of default, the more powerful the doom loop, i.e. the higher the bank holdings of
domestic sovereign bonds.
5.2 Return Covariance
As noted in the introduction, risk shifting by a troubled European country’s banks could
have occurred through the purchase of another troubled country’s bonds rather than through
a re-nationalization of the domestic financial market.
In this section, we therefore consider multiple risky countries. We show that, provided
that balance sheet shocks and fiscal shocks within a country are at least slightly positively
correlated and that fiscal shocks across countries are not perfectly correlated (reasonable as-
sumptions), risk shifting solely through domestic bond holding is a strict equilibrium.
We also show that, with multiple risky countries, and in the presence of debt forgiveness
our “double-decker bailout” theory predicts that when the outlook is bad, Sovereigns in
risky countries have an incentive to relax supervision and let their banks load up on risky
domestic sovereign debt (and not risky foreign sovereign debt) as long as the shocks hitting
the two countries are not perfectly correlated. This would also apply with country solidarity
and international transfers instead of debt forgiveness, as already emphasized in Proposition
11 above: That domestic risky sovereign debt leads to a doom loop but not foreign risky
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sovereign debt is enough by itself to justify that the domestic Sovereign forces its banks to
max out on domestic risky sovereign bonds even when the shocks to the two countries are
perfectly correlated; the fact that they are not only reinforces the argument but in the interest
of space, we do not show it formally. We could also derive analogues to the Propositions
7and 9 regarding the benefits of banking unions, but for conciseness, we refrain from doing
so.
The structure of the model is the same as in the basic model, but there are now two
symmetric risky countries A and B, together with the foreign (safe) country. We consider
banks in countries A and B, but for simplicity, we abstract from banks in the foreign (safe)
country. We denote by si the state of the world at date 1 in country i, and we denote by π the
joint distribution of (sA, sB). We focus on symmetric equilibria throughout.
In each country i ∈ {A,B}, banks have an endowment A at date 0 and some investment
opportunities I(si) with private and social returns (for country i) given by ρ1(si) and βI(si).
Banks invest their net worth at date 0 in a portfolio of safe foreign bonds, risky domestic
bonds and risky foreign bonds. The return on their portfolio at date 1 determines their net
worth at date 1. If it falls short of their investment need, then they are bailed out by their
country’s Sovereign.
We denote by p0 the price of debt at date 0 in both risky countries. We assume that in each
country i ∈ {A,B}, supervision forces banks of country i to hold a portfolio with holdings
of safe foreign sovereign bonds of at least r ≤ r̄, but does not place constraints on the relative
holding of risky sovereign debt of countries A and B. We start by assuming that there is no
debt forgiveness and no international transfers (we reintroduce this possibility later). Each
Sovereign chooses not to engage in supervisory leniency and sets r = r̄, which we assume
from now on.
In each country i, we denote by b∗0 ≥ r̄, bd0 ≥ 0 and b
f
0 ≥ 0 the holdings of foreign





0) = A. We denote by p1(s
d, s f ) the price of debt at date 1 when the domestic
when country i is in state si = sd and country −i is in state s−i = s f .
Proposition 12 (Home Bias with Multiple Risky Countries). Suppose that sd and s f are not
co-monotone and that I(s) is strictly decreasing in s. Then there exists a symmetric equilibrium
where banks in each country i ∈ {A,B} choose to hold as little safe foreign bonds and as much risky





and b f0 = 0.
This equilibrium is strict.
The intuition is simple. Because balance sheet shocks in a given country are perfectly
correlated with fiscal shocks in this country, but imperfectly correlated with fiscal shocks in
other countries, bankers maximize the bailout that they extract from the Sovereign by loading
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up on risky domestic sovereign bonds rather than into risky foreign sovereign bonds.47
In this setting, because as shown in Proposition 12, banks in country i ∈ {A,B} choose to
hold no debt from country −i, there is no interaction between the two risky countries A and
B: Debt prices and quantities in each risky country are determined independently exactly as
in Section 2. All of our results in Section 3 carry through with no modification.48,49
We now introduce the possibility of debt forgiveness and examine how the results in
Section 4 regarding strategic supervisory leniency generalize to a setting with multiple risky
countries. In the interest of space, we focus on debt forgiveness as in Section 4.1 and prove
an equivalent of Proposition 6.
In particular, we want to show that Sovereigns have an incentive to let their own banks
load up on domestic risky bonds but not on foreign risky bonds. To make that point in the
starkest possible way, we assume that supervision is perfect: In each country i, the Sovereign




0) of its banks through supervision. This means that
we not only assume that supervisory capability as we have defined it so far is perfect so
that r̄ = A, but also in addition that the Sovereign can now perfectly determine the relative
holdings of risky sovereign debt of countries A and B.
We can derive the following counterpart to Proposition 6 and show that Sovereigns in
risky countries have an incentive to let their banks load up on risky domestic sovereign debt
as opposed to risky foreign sovereign debt, in order to maximize the concessions from legacy
creditors. This maximizes the rents of domestic banks, and at the same time entirely shifts
the cost of domestic bailouts from domestic consumers to foreign investors by ensuring that
all domestic bailouts take place in states with domestic sovereign debt forgiveness.
Proposition 13 (Lax Supervision with Multiple Risky Countries and Debt Forgiveness). Sup-
pose that I(s) is independent of s and that A = Ī, and that the distribution π(sd, s f ) admits a
continuous density dπ(sd, s f ) = Π(sd, s f )dsdds f . In addition, suppose that in the limit where A
and Ī are small, for the equilibrium with a single risky country and no supervisory leniency r = r̄,
the equilibrium is “bailout-shifting” with s̃ < s̄, and that sd and s f are not co-monotone. Then in the
limit where A and Ī are small, it is optimal for the Sovereign in country i to force its banks to invest
all their net worth A in risky domestic sovereign bonds, and to invest zero in safe foreign sovereign
47We refer the reader to Appendix C.5 for an illustration of Proposition 12 in the context of a simple example
which can be solved in closed form.
48Some of our results were proved in the case where I(s) is independent of s whereas we require here that
I(s) is strictly decreasing in s. In these cases, we can simply take the limit when the range of I(s) collapses to a
point.
49The results in Section 3.3 are particularly interesting in this context. Propositions 14 and 4 apply with no
modification. In response to a bad fiscal shock, there is a re-nationalization of sovereign debt markets: Banks in
country i increase their holdings of risky domestic sovereign debt from country i but not their holdings of risky
foreign sovereign debt from country −i.
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and b f0 = 0.
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Obviously, if the Sovereign could not determine the relative holdings of domestic and
foreign risky bond holdings, but only impose an effective requirement b∗0 ≥ r, then we would
obtain (in the limit where I tends to Ī = A from below) that it is optimal to set r = 0. Banks
would then by themselves load up on domestic risky bonds, choosing bd0 =
A
p0
and b f0 = 0.
Proposition 13 shows that even if the supervisor could perfectly control the portfolios of
banks, it would choose to encourage them to load up on domestic risky bonds.
6 Extensions
The analysis so far has relied on strong assumptions: Sovereign debt maturity follows an as-
set and liability management precept of matching maturity and fiscal receipts; the Sovereign
can always finance bailouts; bankers cannot pledge income and therefore cannot borrow. We
have relaxed all of these assumptions. We content ourselves with a brief description of the
findings. The formal analysis can be found in Appendix B.
Appendix B.1 compares our economy with long-term sovereign bonds which are claims
to coupons accruing at date 2 with an economy where sovereign bonds are short-term, one-
period bonds which are rolled over at date 1. Intuitively, a short maturity has both benefits
and costs. The cost is that a short maturity is bad for fiscal hedging. The benefit is that a
short maturity reduces the risk-shifting possibilities of banks. A short maturity is therefore a
costly substitute to supervision. As a result, a long maturity is preferable when supervision
is efficient enough (r̄ is high enough) or when the banking sector is small enough (A and Ī are
small enough). As a corollary, countries with effective supervision or with a small banking
sector are less likely to shift sovereign debt towards short maturities when the probability of
default increases.
Appendix B.2 relaxes the assumption that no matter what portfolios banks hold, the
Sovereign can always raise enough funds at date 1 to bail them out completely. In states
of the world where funds are insufficient to bail out all the banks, the Sovereign optimally
bails out as many banks as possible, saving first the banks with the highest pre-bailout net
worth. This pecking order maximizes the number of banks that can be saved and hence
ex-post welfare. While banks are ex-ante identical, equilibria can be asymmetric due to the
rat race among banks to be on the top of the bailout pecking order. Namely, equilibrium
resembles that of equilibria of full-information first-price auctions or wars of attrition. The
complication comes from the fact that the object that competitors vie for—here subsidies—is
50Assuming that A and Ī are small considerably simplifies the analysis by allowing to neglect the change in
debt prices induced by changes in portfolios in the calculation of the rents of bankers.
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itself endogenous, as the pot of subsidies depends on the distribution of “bids”, namely the
holdings of foreign bonds.
Appendix B.3 investigates the role of leverage. The feedback loop is stronger, because of
a new mechanism operating through the endogenous leverage of banks. As sovereign risk
rises, banks have to reduce leverage. This is because banks’ borrowing spreads increase, re-
flecting the increased probability of a default on the private debt that they issue. This requires
a larger bailout, which puts further pressure on the Sovereign budget etc., ad infinitum. The
resulting multiplier is particularly high if the Sovereign does not enforce private claims of
international investors on domestic banks when it defaults on sovereign debt.
7 Future Research
The paper’s main insights were summarized in the introduction, so we briefly discuss possi-
ble alleys for the study of the doom loop, fragmentation and the supervisory structure. Our
research leaves open a number of fascinating questions. First, we have assumed that the
bailouts take the fiscal route. As observed recently in many countries, central banks may
participate in the bailout, perhaps risking inflation and devaluation. While our analysis is
consistent with the central bank participating in the bailout, it assumes that the cost of such
non-conventional intervention is a fiscal one rather than inflation or devaluation. Second, we
have assumed that sovereign defaults are not strategic (the Sovereign defaults only if it can-
not repay). If defaults are strategic, domestic exposure choices by domestic banks influence
the incentives to default (the Sovereign is less likely to default if its debt is held domestically),
opening up the possibility of complex strategic interactions between banks and sovereigns,
and conferring a benefit (disciplining the Sovereign) upon debt re-nationalization. Finally,
further research should be devoted to the governance of the banking union, and in particu-
lar to the interactions between prudential and fiscal integrations.
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A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
The choice of r for a given p0 involves off-equilibrium calculations. We therefore cannot make
use of the decomposition (4) provided earlier, which only holds in equilibrium when the
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martingale property of prices (2) holds. Instead, we use the decomposition (8), which holds
both in equilibrium when the martingale property of prices (2) holds and off equilibrium
when it does not. Hence we write













βI(s) + βB[ρ1(s)− I(s) + A]
]
dπ(s),
R0 = −(1− βB)
∫










The supervisor sets r ≤ r̄ in order to maximize W0 taking p0 as given but subject to the two
constraints
p1(s) = 1− F(B1(s)|s),




We denote the resulting dependence of the solution on r given p0 as p1(s, r; p0), B1(s, r; p0),
W0(r; p0), E0(r; p0),R0(r; p0) and C0(r; p0).
Towards a contradiction, consider a candidate equilibrium with r < r̄, and suppose that
there are bailouts with strictly positive probability. The date-0 prices p0 satisfies the fixed
point equation p0 =
∫
p1(s, r; p0)dπ(s). Given this price p0, consider setting r′ ∈ (r, r̄). We
now proceed to show thatW0(r′; p0) >W0(r; p0), a contradiction. We do so by showing that
E0(r′; p0) > E0(r; p0),R0(r′; p0) < R0(r; p0), and C0(r′; p0) > C0(r; p0).
It is easy to see that p1(s, r′; p0) ≥ p1(s, r; p0) and B1(s, r′; p0) ≤ B1(s, r; p0) for all s, where
the inequalities are strict with positive probability. Using B1(s, r′; p0) ≤ B1(s, r; p0) with a
strict inequality with positive probability, we get
∫ ∞
B1(s,r′;p0)











where the inequality is strict with positive probability. This implies that E0(r′; p0) > E0(r; p0).
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Using the fact that r′ > r and p1(s, r′; p0) ≥ p1(s, r; p0) with a strict inequality with posi-
tive probability, we get
min{r′ + (A− r′) p1(s, r
′; p0)
p0
− I(s), 0} ≥ min{r + (A− r) p1(s, r; p0)
p0
− I(s), 0}
where the inequality is strict with positive probability. This follows because given that A ≥ Ī,
we necessarily have p1(s,r;p0)p0 < 1 whenever r + (A− r)
p1(s,r;p0)
p0
− I(s) < 0. This implies that
R0(r′; p0) < R0(r; p0).
Finally note that using the fact that r′ > r, p1(s, r′; p0) ≥ p1(s, r; p0) with a strict inequality
with positive probability and p0 =
∫
p1(s, r; p0)dπ(s), we get
∫ [


















This implies that C0(r′; p0) > C0(r; p0). 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
We use the decomposition given (4) and write
W0 = E0 −R0.

















with strict inequalities if there are bailouts with positive probability and equalities otherwise.
Both bounds are attained for r̄ = Ī where there are no bailouts. The result in the proposition
follows. In the case where p0B0 is kept constant instead, the result is even stronger since B0
increases (and p0 decreases) as we lower r̄. 
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 4 and Collective Moral Hazard
Proof of Proposition 4. Differentiating the first-order condition for the choice of b∗0 by
banks, the equilibrium date-0 and date-1 price conditions (10) and (11) leads to the following



















0 if s ≥ s̃,











































1− A−rp1(s)2 f (B1(s)|s)
dπ(s).
Solving this linear system of equations yields the results in Proposition 4. 
Collective moral hazard. We now show that for a given supervisory capacity, the incentives
for banks to take on domestic sovereign debt are increased when other banks do so—a mani-
festation of the strategic complementarities in financial risk-taking at work in the model—so
that the effectiveness of supervision depends on the risk taken by the banking system as a
whole. The main difference with the collective moral hazard problem in Farhi-Tirole (2012)
is that bailouts are perfectly targeted here while imperfect targeting was key to the strategic
complementarity result of Farhi-Tirole (2012).51 There are also strategic complementarities
in financial risk-taking, which justify macroprudential supervision, but through a different,
general equilibrium effect on the pricing of debt and the occurrence of default rather than
through untargeted bailouts.52
51This paper belongs to a literature that studies the combination of limited commitment on the part of the
Sovereign, and ex-post bailouts. This gives rise to strategic complementarities in financial risk-taking, and
provides a rationale for macroprudential regulation (see e.g. Schneider-Tornell 2004, Acharya-Yorulmazer 2008,
Ranciere et al. 2008, Diamond-Rajan 2012, Farhi-Tirole 2012, and Chari-Kehoe 2016). This literature relies on
mechanisms by which bailouts are extended only when sufficiently many banks are in trouble ex post, so that
the incentives for individual financial risk taking increase with collective financial risk taking ex ante. A crucial
feature of these mechanisms is that bailouts cannot be perfectly targeted ex post to troubled banks.
52In Farhi-Tirole (2012), we study a model where the combination of limited commitment on the part of the
Sovereign, and ex-post untargeted bailouts gives rise to strategic complementarities in financial risk-taking,
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The banks’ choices of opaqueness, and thereby the exposures to the domestic Sovereign,
are strategic complements: Incurring the cost of making one’s balance sheet more opaque
is more tempting if the put on taxpayer money is more attractive; in turn, this put is more
attractive when the sovereign bond price is more volatile, which it is when the other banks
take a larger gamble.















where we have left the dependence of p0 and p1(s) on b∗0 implicit. The next proposition
performs comparative statics with respect to b∗0 taking into account the effect of b
∗
0 on p0.
Proposition 14 (Strategic Complementarities in Banks’ Domestic Exposures). Suppose that
I(s) = Ī is independent of s, and that A = Ī. There are strategic complementarities across banks







for a bank of increasing its individual
investment b∗0(i) in foreign bonds is increasing in the aggregate investment b
∗
0 of banks in foreign
bonds.
Proof. Denote by ε the random variables p1(s)p0 . For a given aggregate b
∗
0 , the random vari-
able ε follows some distribution H(ε) such that
∫ 1
0 (1− ε)dH(ε) =
∫ ∞
1 (ε− 1)dH(ε). For an










(A− b∗0(i))(ε− 1)dH(ε)−Ψ(r̄− b∗0(i)).


















0 with associated prices p0,
p1(s), p′0, p
′
1(s) and distributions H and H
′. Let s̃ be such that p1(s̃)p0 = 1 (and so bailouts
occur if and only if s < s̃). We proceed in two steps.
and provides a rationale for macroprudential regulation. The origin of the strategic complementarities there
is the following: when other banks take on more financial risk ex ante, the Sovereign increases its untargeted
bailout by lowering interest rates ex post; the anticipation of lower interest rates ex post in turn induces any
given bank to take on more financial risk ex ante. This mechanism is entirely shut down here since ex-post
bailouts come in the form of perfectly targeted transfers to troubled banks instead of untargeted reductions in
interest rates that benefit all banks, healthy and troubled. Instead strategic complementarities arise through
a completely different mechanism: When other banks take on more financial risk ex ante, domestic sovereign
bonds become riskier, and hence a more tempting way to gamble on ex-post perfectly targeted bailouts by the
Sovereign.
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In the first step, we prove that p′0 < p0, p
′
1(s) = p1(s) for s ≥ s̃, and
p′1(s)
p′0
> p1(s)p0 for s ≥ s̃.
Indeed, the price p1(s) is a locally stable solution of the following fixed-point equation






Towards a contradiction, suppose that p′0 ≥ p0. Then for any p1(s), the right-hand side of
the above equation decreases when b∗0 is replaced by b
∗′
0 . Hence p
′
1(s) < p1(s) decreases for
all s, and strictly decreases for s < s̃. This contradicts the martingale property of prices, and
proves that p′0 < p0. For all s ≥ s̃,
p1(s̃)
p′0
> p1(s̃)p0 ≥ 1. Hence for all s ≥ s̃ the pre-bailout net
worth of banks satisfies b∗′0 + (A− b∗′0 )
p1(s̃)
p′0
> b∗0 + (A− b∗0)
p1(s̃)
p0
. This in turn implies that it
is still the case that there are no bailouts for s > s̃ when aggregate debt is b∗′0 . By implication,
p′1(s) = p1(s) is the same for s ≥ s̃.












The incentive to marginally reduce b∗0(i) is therefore higher when the aggregate foreign debt


















Depending on the exact shape of the cost function Ψ, these strategic complementarities
can be strong enough to lead to multiple equilibria: Equilibria with low exposure of domes-
tic banks to domestic sovereign default risk (high b∗0) and equilibria with high exposure of
domestic banks to domestic sovereign default risk (low b∗0). Because multiplicity is not the
focus of this paper, we simply illustrate this possibility with a simple example in Appendix
C.2.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Suppose first that there is debt forgiveness but no bailout in state s. Then we have B̄0(s) =





This shows that B̄0(s) = B̄1(s) is increasing in s, proving the second statement in the propo-
sition.
Suppose now that there is debt forgiveness and a bailout in state s. The bailout equation








B̃0[1− F(B1(s; B̃0)|s)] = [1− F(B1(s; B̃0)|s)]B1(s; B̃0)− [I(s)− r].
This immediately implies that the date-1 debt after debt forgiveness and issuance corre-
sponds to the peak of the Laffer curve B1(s; B̄0(s)) = B̄1(s), proving the first statement in












The first equation shows that B̄1(s) is increasing in s. The second equation shows that B̄0(s)
is increasing in B̄1(s) and in s. This immediately implies that B̄0(s) is increasing in s, proving
the second statement in the proposition. 






and using the fact that dB1(s)dr =
dB̄1(s)
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Figure 5: Debt Forgiveness when the Equilibrium is Bailout-Shifting.
For s ≤ s̃, we have
























Integrating this equation over s ≤ s̃ with measure dπ(s), and combining with equation (16)





> 0, this implies that dp0dr > 0.
Going back to the definition (15) of s̃, this in turn implies that ds̃dr ≥ 0. Together with the
implication from the definition (14) of s̄ that ds̄dr = 0, this proves the first statement in the
proposition.
We now turn to the second statement in the proposition. We consider the equilibrium for a
given fixed diversification requirement 0 < r ≤ r̄. We fix the value of p0 and characterize the
dependence of welfareW0 on the choice of r̃ by the supervisor, given p0, in the corresponding
subgame. In what follows, all the derivatives should therefore be understood as keeping p0
fixed. Once again, we leave the dependence of all variables on p0 and r̃ implicit to make
the notation lighter. We next prove that dW0dr̃ |r̃=r < 0. This implies that 0 < r cannot be an










[E− B1(s)] f (E|s)dE +
∫ B1(s)
0
[E−Φ] f (E|s)dE + βI(s)






For s ≤ s̃, there is debt forgiveness and a bailout, and we have dB1(s)dr =
dB̄1(s)
dr = 0 and
r̃ + (A− r̃)B0(s)B0
p1(s)
p0




For s̃ < s ≤ s̄, there is debt forgiveness and no bailout, and we have dB1(s)dr =
dB̄1(s)
dr = 0 and
r̃ + (A− r̃)B0(s)B0
p1(s)
p0













and r̃ + (A− r̃)B0(s)B0
p1(s)
p0






Together with the fact thatW0(s) is continuous (so that infinitesimal changes in the thresh-








A.6 Proof of Proposition 7
We first prove the first result of the proposition, i.e. that the domestic country is better off
committing to tough supervision. We need to show thatW ′0 <W0.
We have p′0B
′
0 = p0B0. It is easy to verify that p
′
0 < p0, B
′
0 > B0, and s̃
′ = s̃ < s̄ < s̄′.
And moreover: for all s < s̃ = s̃′, B′1(s) = B1(s), and B
′
0(s) < B0(s); for all s̃ = s̃
′ ≤ s ≤ s̄,
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B′0(s) = B0(s) = B1(s) = B
′
1(s); for all s̄ < s ≤ s̄′, B1(s) = B0(s) = B0 < B′1(s) = B′0(s) < B′0;






We writeW0 = E0 −R0 andW ′0 = E ′0 −R′0. Because B′1(s) ≥ B1(s) for all s with a strict
inequality with positive probability, and because∫ ∫ ∞
B′1(s)
B′0(s) f (E|s)dEπ(s)ds =
∫ ∫ ∞
B1(s)
B0(s) f (E|s)dEπ(s)ds = p′0B′0 = p0B0,
we have E ′0 < E0.
We will show shortly that we also haveR′0 > R0, which proves the proposition. We have
R0 = −(1− βB)
∫
{s≤s̃}















We use s̃ = s̃′. For all s < s̃ = s̃′, we have B′1(s) = B1(s) and B
′
0(s) < B0(s). Together with the
fact that p0B0 = p′0B
′









r̄ + (A− r̄)B0(s)B0
p1(s)
p0
< A. The first result in the proposition follows.
The second result, i.e. that a supranational supervisor who puts the same welfare weight
on international investors and domestic consumers implements the commitment solution is
immediate. Indeed, supervisory leniency increases the total rents of banks (who carry a wel-
fare weight of βB < 1 for the international supervisor) at the expense of domestic consumers
and international investors (who both carry an equal welfare weight of 1 for the international
supervisor). 
A.7 Proof of Propositions 8 and 11
In the presence of transfers but without bailouts, the problem of foreign countries is
min
B1≤B0
{ΓF(B1|s)− [1− F(B1|s)][B1 − B0]}.
53The only nontrivial part is to show that for all s ≤ s̃′ = s̃, B′0(s) < B0(s). This can be seen as follows. For
s < s̃′ = s̃, we have B′1(s) = B1(s) and p
′




0 = p0B0 and the fact that A = I(s)








Since B1(s)[1− F(B1(s)|s)] < p0B0 for s < s̃ = s̃′, this implies that B′0(s) < B0(s).
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Figure 6: Country Solidarity and International Transfers when the Equilibrium is Bailout-Shifting.






Transfers are indeed strictly positive T∗(s) > 0 when s < s̄ where the threshold s̄ is defined
by B∗1(s̄) = B0.
In the presence of transfers, bailouts matter if and only if s ≤ s̃ where the threshold s̃ is




= 1. If there are strictly positive bailouts and transfers,
the problem of foreign countries is minB1{ΓF(B1|s) − [1− F(B1|s)][B1 − B0 + b0]}. The so-
lution B∗∗1 (s) < B
∗
1(s) is characterized by the first-order condition Γ + B
∗∗
1 (s)− (B0 − b0) =
1−F(B∗∗1 (s)|s)
f (B∗∗1 (s)|s)
, the associated level of transfers and bailouts are T∗∗(s) and X∗∗(s).
Finally, we define T∗∗∗(s) and B∗∗∗1 (s) by T
∗∗∗(s) = −[1− F(B∗∗∗1 (s)|s)](B∗∗∗1 (s)− B0) and
1−F(B∗∗∗1 (s)|s)
p0





ds ∈ (0, 1) and
dB∗∗∗1 (s)
ds = 1 for all s. We have B
∗∗∗
1 (s̃) = B
∗
1(s̃). Define ˜̃s by B
∗∗∗
1 ( ˜̃s) = B
∗∗
1 ( ˜̃s).
As in Section 4.1, we assume that the equilibrium given the fixed diversification require-
ment r = r̄ is bailout shifting with s̃ < s̄. This situation is guaranteed to occur in bad times
when Γ is large. Then the equilibrium is as follows: For s ≥ s̄, there are neither transfers
nor bailouts T(s) = X(s) = 0, and date-1 debt is given by B1(s) = B0; for s̃ ≤ s < s̄,
there are transfers T(s) = T∗(s) > 0 but no bailouts X(s) = 0, and date-1 debt is given
by B1(s) = B∗1(s); for ˜̃s ≤ s < s̃, there are transfers T(s) = T∗∗∗(s) > 0 but no bailouts
X(s) = 0, and date-1 debt is given by B1(s) = B∗∗∗1 (s); and for s < ˜̃s there are transfers
54The second-order condition is satisfied if the density f is decreasing.
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T(s) = T∗∗(s) > 0 and bailouts X(s) = X∗∗(s) > 0.
The threshold s̃ is decreasing in r ≤ r̄ and s̄ is independent of r ≤ r̄, so that the equilibrium
given the fixed diversification requirement r remains bailout shifting for all r ≤ r̄. For a given
p0 and B0, B1(s) is independent of r when s > ˜̃s, but crucially, it is strictly increasing in r
when s < ˜̃s . This last property is key, and means that for a given p0 and B0, a lower r leads
to such an increase in transfers T(s) that it actually decreases B1(s) even though it increases
the required bailout absent transfers. It arises because the doom loop, which is stronger
when r is lower, makes transfers more attractive at the margin for foreigners by magnifying
the reduction in the probability of default resulting from a transfers. As a result, the only
equilibrium features maximal supervisory leniency r = 0.
Starting from that equilibrium and given p0 and B0, if the Sovereign unexpectedly forced
banks to invest in an exogenous risky asset with the same payoff as the equilibrium payoff of
the domestic sovereign bond instead of the risky domestic sovereign bond, then B1(s) would
be given by B∗1(s) for all s < s̄, and hence the probability of default would be strictly higher,
and welfare strictly lower.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 10
Denote byW0 = E0 −R0 andW ′0 = E ′0 −R′0 the welfare levels in the true economy under
shared supervision when r = r̄ and under domestic supervision when r = 0. Denote by











ing welfare levels in the fictitious economy. We have W0 = W
f ictitious
0 . The welfare gains




0 > 0 respec-
tively.
The intuition for magnification of the welfare gains from shared supervision by the doom
loop is that when supervision is relaxed: (1) The doom loop leads to bigger bailouts and more
ex-post debt forgiveness, which is priced-in ex ante by international investors, leading to
lower ex-ante domestic sovereign debt prices, higher legacy debt, and more defaults so that
E ′ f ictitious0 > E ′0; (2) the doom loop makes domestic sovereign debt riskier, leading to more























0 > B0, and s̃ = s̃
′ = s̃ f ictitious = s̃′ f ictitious < s̄ < s̄′ f ictitious < s̄′. And moreover:
for all s < s̃, B′1(s) = B
′ f ictitious




0 (s) < B0(s); for all s̃ = s̃
′ ≤
s ≤ s̄, B′0(s) = B
′ f ictitious




1 (s); for all s̄ < s ≤ s̄′ f ictitious,
B1(s) = B0(s) = B0 < B′1(s) = B
′ f ictitious









all s̄′ f ictitious ≤ s < s̄′, B1(s) = B0(s) = B0 < B
′ f ictitious
1 (s) = B
′ f ictitious








0; and for all s̄
′ < s, B1(s) = B0(s) = B0 < B
′ f ictitious
1 (s) = B
′ f ictitious
0 (s) =
























We use s̃ = s̃′ = s̃ f ictitious = s̃′ f ictitious. For all s < s̃, we have B′1(s) = B1(s) and B
′
0(s) < B0(s).
Together with the fact that p0B0 = p′0B
′










= R1(s). This implies thatR
′ f ictitious
0 < R′0.
Because B′1(s) ≥ B
′ f ictitious
1 (s) for all s with a strict inequality with positive probability,
and because∫ ∫ ∞
B′1(s)
B′0(s) f (E|s)dEπ(s)ds =
∫ ∫ ∞
B′ f ictitious1 (s)
B′ f ictitious0 (s) f (E|s)dEπ(s)ds = p0B0,
we have E ′ f ictitious0 > E ′0. 
A.9 Proof of Proposition 12
A symmetric equilibrium is characterized by the following pricing equations
p1(sd, s f ) = 1− F(B1(sd, s f )|sd),
p0 =
∫
p1(sd, s f )dπ(sd, s f ),
with
B1(sd, s f ) = B0 + max{
I(sd)− b∗0







p1(s f , sd)
p1(sd, s f )
, 0},
55The only nontrivial part is to show that for all s ≤ s̃, B′0(s) < B
′ f ictitious
0 (s) < B0(s). This can be seen as
follows. For s < s̃, we have B′1(s) = B
′ f ictitious




1 (s) = p1(s), which together
with p′0B
′








Similarly, we can write
B0(s) = B1(s)− (A− r̄)
1− R1(s)
1− F(B1(s)|s)




Since B1(s)[1 − F(B1(s)|s)] < p0B0 for s < s̃, this implies that B′0(s) < B0(s). It is easy to verify that






























0) = A and b̃
∗
0 ≥ r̄.
We denote by B0 the quantity of debt at date 0 and by p0 the price of debt at date 0 in
both risky countries. We assume that in each country i ∈ {A,B}, supervision forces banks of
country i to hold a portfolio with holdings of safe foreign sovereign bonds of at least r ≤ r̄,
but does not place constraints on the relative holding of risky sovereign debt of countries A
and B. We start by assuming that there is no debt forgiveness (we reintroduce this possibility
later). Each Sovereign chooses not to engage in supervisory leniency and sets r = r̄, which
we assume from now on.
In each country i, we denote by b∗0 ≥ r̄, bd0 ≥ 0 and b
f
0 ≥ 0 the holdings of foreign





0) = A. We denote by B1(s
d, s f ) the quantity of debt at date 1 and by p1(sd, s f )
the price of debt at date 1 when the domestic when country i is in state si = sd and country
−i is in state s−i = s f .
Assume that the equilibrium is of the form given by the proposition. Under the assumed
equilibrium, we have p1(sd, s f ) = p1(sd) and p1(s f , sd) = p1(s f ), for some increasing func-






b f0 = 0, and that this preference is strict. This proves that the assumed equilibrium is indeed
an equilibrium, and that it is strict.
We use the following result. Take a supermodular function g(x1, x2) and take two marginals
F1 and F2. Consider the problem of maximizing E[g(X1, X2)] subject to the marginals of
(X1, X2) being given by F1 and F2. Then the maximum is reached when the two variables are
co-monotone. This is a well-known solution of the Monge-Kantorovich optimal transport
problem in the case of supermodular objective functions.56
We apply this result with g(x1, x2) = max{x1 + x2, 0}, with F1 given by the distribution
of b̃∗0 + p1(s
d)(A − b̃∗0) and F2 given by the distribution of −I(sd). The random variables
X1 = p1(sd)b̃d0 + p1(s
f )(A− b̃∗0 − b̃d0) and X2 = −I(sd) are such that the marginals of (X1, X2)
are given by F1 and F2. They are co-monotone if and only if b̃d0 = A− b̃∗0 .
This shows given b̃∗0 ≥ r̄, banks strictly prefer b̃d0 = A− b̃∗0 and b̃
f
0 = 0. It is then immedi-
ate to see that banks strictly prefer b̃∗0 = r̄, b̃
d
0 = A− b̃∗0 , and b̃
f
0 = 0. 
56See Galichon (2016) and references therein.
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A.10 Proof of Proposition 13
When choosing the portfolio of banks, the domestic Sovereign takes p0 as given and maxi-




0) for a given p0:
W0 =
∫
W0(sd, s f )Π(sd, s f )dsdds f ,
with




E− B1(sd, s f )
]
f (E|sd)dE +
∫ B1(sd,s f )
0
[E−Φ] f (E|sd)dE + βI(sd)
+ βBρ1(sd) + βB max{b∗0 + bd0
B0(sd, s f )
B0
p1(sd, s f ) + b
f
0
B0(s f , sd)
B0
p1(s f , sd)− I(sd), 0}.









E− B1(sd, s f )
]
f (E|sd)dEΠ(sd, s f )dsdds f +
∫ B1(sd,s f )
0
[E−Φ] f (E|sd)dEΠ(sd, s f )dsdds f .
This is because with this portfolio, all bank bailouts occur in states where there is debt for-
giveness, and in these states, the amount of post-debt forgiveness debt is independent of the
banks’ portfolios. This implies that for all (sd, s f ), post-debt forgiveness B1(sd, s f ) is greater
for any other portfolio for banks.





, and b f0 = 0 is a maximizer of the the banks’ rents
term
∫
βB max{b∗0 + bd0
B0(sd, s f )
B0
p1(sd, s f ) + b
f
0
B0(s f , sd)
B0
p1(s f , sd)− I(sd), 0}Π(sd, s f )dsdds f .
The first-order term in A = Ī in this expression is given by
∫








p̂1(s f )− Ī, 0}Π(sd, s f )dsdds f ,
where B̂0(sd) and p̂1(sd) are the equilibrium values for A = Ī = 0 (and the value of p0 under
consideration). Using the same result for the Monge-Kantorovich optimal transport problem
in the case of supermodular objective functions as in the proof of Proposition 12, it follows
this expression is maximized when either bd0 = 0 or b
f
0 = 0 and in addition b
∗
0 = 0. 
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B Online Appendix: Extensions
B.1 Sovereign Debt Maturity
In this section, we investigate the role of sovereign debt maturity. More specifically, we
compare our economy with long-term sovereign bonds which are claims to coupons accruing
at date 2 with an economy where sovereign bonds are short-term, one-period bonds which
are rolled over at date 1.
We assume that there is no debt forgiveness (either because debt is on the right side of the
legacy creditors’ Laffer curve, or because debt is on the wrong side of the legacy creditors’
Laffer curve but investors have difficulties coordinating on a debt relief package). It is easy
to see that the absence of supervisory leniency extends to the setting of this section. We
therefore make use of the fact that r = r̄ throughout.
With long-term bonds, welfare is given by the decomposition (4) so that


















(1− βB)min{r̄ + (A− r̄) p1(s)
p0
− I(s), 0}dπ(s).
We now consider the economy with short-term bonds. We denote all variables with a
tilde. To make the comparison with the economy with short-term bonds meaningful, we
impose that the Sovereign must raise the same amount of revenues G0 in period 0, i.e.
B̃0 = B0
∫
[1− F(B1(s)|s)] = G0. (17)
In addition, the Sovereign must raise exactly enough revenues at date 1 to repay the date-0
debt that is coming due, i.e. we must have for all s57
B̃1(s)[1− F(B̃1(s)|s)] = B̃0. (18)
57To give short-term debt a good shot, we assume that the Sovereign is always able to roll over its short-term
debt. This is indeed the case if negative shocks s are not too catastrophic, so that the debt can be rolled over by
pledging income in the good realizations at date 2.
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Because Ī ≤ A, no bailouts are required. Welfare is given by




















Using (17) and (18), we can write
W0 − W̃0 = (E0 − Ẽ0)− (R0 − R̃0),
with
E0 − Ẽ0 =
∫
Φ[F(B̃1(s)|s)− F(B1(s)|s)]dπ(s),
R0 − R̃0 = −(1− βB)
∫
min{r̄ + (A− r̄) p1(s)
p0
− I(s), 0}dπ(s).
The term (E0 − Ẽ0) is given by the difference in default costs, and the second term −(R0 −
R̃0) represents the welfare impact of the rents extracted by bankers at the expense of con-
sumers because of bailouts when domestic sovereign bonds are long term. In the proof of
the proposition below, we show that under some additional assumptions on the distributions
of E, the first term is positive.58 The second term is always negative and arises because by is-
suing short-term bonds, the Sovereign reduces the risk-taking possibilities of banks and insu-
lates the banks from fiscal developments—there is no feedback loop between banks and the
Sovereign. As a result, the intuitive asset-liability management (ALM) principle of matching
maturities of incomes and payments holds when the minimum diversification requirement r̄
is high enough: Long-term debt then leads to a strictly lower expected probability of default
than short-term debt.
Intuitively, a short maturity has both benefits and costs. The cost is that a short maturity
is bad for fiscal hedging. The benefit is that a short maturity reduces the risk-shifting possi-
bilities of banks. A short maturity is therefore a costly substitute to supervision. As a result,
a long maturity is preferable when supervision is efficient enough (r̄ is high enough) or when
58The additional assumptions are that F(E|s) = F(E− s) where F is increasing and convex. These assump-
tions, which imply the monotone hazard rate properties ∂( f (E|s)/(1−F(E|s)))∂s ≤ 0 and
∂( f (E|s)/(1−F(E|s)))
∂E > 0, are
sufficient but not necessary to prove the result.
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the banking sector is small enough (A and Ī are small enough).
Proposition 15 (Optimal Debt Maturity). Suppose that F(E|s) = F(E− s) where F is increasing
and convex. Then for r̄ high enough or for A and Ī low enough, welfare is higher with long-term
sovereign bonds than with short-term sovereign bondsW0 > W̃0.
Proof. We prove the result for r̄ high enough. The proof of the result for for A and Ī low
enough is similar. Note that B1(s) ≥ B0 and that B1(s) converges to B0 for all s as r̄ goes to Ī,
while B̃1(s) is independent of r̄. Hence the result follows if we can show that
∫
Φ[F(B̃1(s)|s)−
F(B0|s)]dπ(s) < 0. We now proceed to prove this result, which we refer to as result A. The
result is a direct consequence of the following related (dual) result, which we refer to as result
B. Let B0 be defined by ∫
B0[1− F(B0|s)]dπ(s) = G0
as above, and let ˜̃B1(s) and ˜̃G0 be defined by the system of equations











we need to show that ∫ B0
˜̃B1(s)
dπ(s) > 1.
By Jensen’s inequality, result B is implied by the following result, which we refer to as result
C:
B0∫ ˜̃B1(s)dπ(s) > 1.
Since
∫
F( ˜̃B1(s)− s)dπ(s) =
∫


























∫ ˜̃B1(s′)dπ(s′) + λ( ˜̃B1(s)− ∫ ˜̃B1(s′)dπ(s′))− s] and ˜̃B1(s)− ∫ ˜̃B1(s′)dπ(s′) are de-
creasing in s for all λ ≥ 0, the right-hand side is the covariance of two decreasing functions




∫ ˜̃B1(s′)dπ(s′)− s)dπ(s) and g(1) = ∫ F( ˜̃B1(s)− s)dπ(s), we get result C.
Results B and A follow, concluding the proof of the Proposition.
There are obvious extensions of our setup that would reinforce the conclusion of Propo-
sition 15. For example, the desirable features of short-term sovereign debt in terms of lim-
iting the risk-taking possibilities of banks, bailouts and feedback loops between banks and
sovereigns, would be mitigated in a model with a richer set of risk taking possibilities apart
from domestic sovereign debt, or in an infinite horizon version of our model with overlap-
ping generations of bankers, consumers and investors, where some banks hold domestic
sovereign debt for liquidity in all periods.
Connection to the sovereign debt literature on debt maturity. The result in Proposition 15
is related to a set of arguments in the sovereign debt literature that seek to rationalize the
empirical observation that Sovereigns tend to shorten the maturity of their debt when the
probability of default increases.59,60 This literature has two branches. The first one focuses
on the different hedging properties of short-term bonds and long-term bonds. The second
one focuses on the different incentive effects (for the Sovereign) of short-term bonds and
long term bonds: Short-term bonds limit the possibilities of dilution, increase the incentives
to pay down debt and implement pro-market reforms in order to lower interest rates for
future borrowing. Proposition 15 identifies a novel tradeoff in debt maturity choice that
requires balancing hedging effects and a different form of incentive effects. On the one hand,
a long maturity structure might be desirable for fiscal hedging. On the other hand, a short
maturity structure might be desirable to reduce the risk-shifting opportunities of banks when
the Sovereign cannot commit not to bail them out ex post and cannot adequately supervise
59See e.g., Angeletos (2002), Buera-Nicolini (2004), Jeanne (2009), Bolton-Jeanne (2009), Hatchondo-
Martinez (2009), Chaterjee-Eyigungor (2012), Arellano-Ramanarayanan (2012), Dovis (2012), Broner-Lorenzoni-
Schmukler (2013), Aguiar-Amador (2014), and Fernandez-Martin (2015).
60There is also a corporate finance literature on debt maturity. For example, Calomiris-Kahn (1991) and
Diamond-Rajan (2001) show that the threat of not rolling over short-term debt can be used to discipline a
manager. The fact that existing long-term bondholders hold a claim on liquidated assets which makes them
vulnerable to dilution has been the focus of a large literature since Fama-Miller (1972). Brunnermeier-Oehmke
(2013) shows how this can lead to a maturity rat race towards short maturities. Sovereign default differs from
bankruptcy in that there is no liquidation after default.
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them ex ante.
Corollary. Countries with effective supervision or with a small banking sector or are less likely to
shift towards short maturities when the probability of default increases.
B.2 Limited Bailouts and Endogenous Diversification
So far, we have maintained the assumption that no matter what portfolios banks hold, the
Sovereign can always raise enough funds at date 1 to bail them out completely. We now relax
this assumption.61 We show that when the Sovereign’s ability to bail out the banking system
is limited, banks naturally limit their exposure to domestic sovereign default risk.
We assume that there is no debt forgiveness. It is easy to see that the absence of super-
visory leniency extends to the setting of this section. We therefore make use of the fact that
r = r̄ throughout.
To simplify, we assume that I(s) = Ī is independent of s so that there are no financial
shocks but only fiscal shocks. Because A ≥ Ī, if banks choose b∗0 = Ī, they do not need
a bailout. But we assume that there are some states of the world where the Sovereign is
not able to fully bail out banks if they choose b∗0 = r̄. In states of the world s where funds
are insufficient to bail out all the banks, the Sovereign optimally bails out as many banks as
possible, saving first the banks with the highest pre-bailout net worth. This pecking order
maximizes the number of banks that can be saved and hence ex-post welfare.
While banks are ex-ante identical, equilibria can be asymmetric. We therefore look for an
equilibrium in which bankers invest different amounts in foreign bonds, according to a prob-
ability distribution with G with support contained in [r̄, Ī]. This probability distribution G is
an endogenous object, to be solved for as part of the equilibrium. It might be a degenerate
atom, in which case the equilibrium is symmetric.
In every state s, there is an endogenous threshold b∗0(s) such that bankers with b
∗
0 ≥ b∗0(s)
secure enough post-bailout funds to finance their investment. This threshold is monotoni-
cally decreasing in s. There is also an endogenous threshold b̃∗0(s) ≥ b∗0(s) such that bankers
with b∗0 ≥ b̃∗0(s) can finance their investment without any bailout. This threshold is defined
by Ī − b̃∗0(s)− (A− b̃∗0(s))
p1(s)
p0
= 0, and is also monotonically decreasing in s.









− [B1(s)− B0], (19)
61Here it is important to restrict the concept of “banking union” to the notion of “shared supervision”; for,
by providing a larger pool of bailout funds a banking union could increase incentives for risk shifting if the




[ Ī − b∗0 − (A− b∗0)
p1(s)
p0
]dG(b∗0) = [B1(s)− B0]p1(s),
where
B1(s) = B0 +
∫
b∗0∈[b∗0(s),b̃∗0(s))









This simply guarantees that the Sovereign determines how much debt to issue at date 1
in order to maximize the number of banks that can be saved.62 Note that the Sovereign
necessarily issues less debt than the amount that would maximize the revenues from this
issuance. This is because at the peak of the Laffer curve (the value of B1(s) which maxi-
mizes [B1(s)− B0][1− F(B1(s)|s)], a marginal reduction in issuance B1(s)− B0 brings about
a second-order reduction in issuance revenues [B1(s)− B0][1− F(B1(s)|s)] but a first-order
improvement in banks’ pre-bailout net worth b∗0 + (A − b∗0)
1−F(B1(s)|s)
p0
, and hence a first-
order reduction in required bailouts and by implication a first-order increase in the number
of banks that can be saved.
In addition, the following pricing equations must hold




An individual banker who invests b∗0 gets a bailout in states s > s(b
∗
0) but no bailout in
states s < s(b∗0), where s(b
∗
0) is the inverse of b
∗
0(s) and is hence monotonically decreasing
in b∗0 . There is another threshold s̃(b
∗
0) such that the entrepreneur does not need a bailout
to finance his investment when s > s̃(b∗0), where s̃(b
∗
0) is the inverse of b̃
∗
0(s) and is hence
monotonically decreasing in b∗0 . This banker now faces a meaningful tradeoff in his portfolio
decision. By increasing his investment b∗0 in foreign bonds, he secures a bailout in some
states of the world where he did not get a bailout by rising in the Sovereign bailout pecking
order, but loses out in states where he does not need a bailout to fund his investment. The






max{I − b∗0 − (A− b∗0)
1− F(B1(s)|s)
p0
, 0}dG(b∗0) = [B1(s)− B0][1− F(B1(s)|s)].
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corresponding optimality conditions states that b∗0 maximizes his welfare
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The determination of equilibrium resembles that of equilibria of full-information first-
price auctions or wars of attrition. The complication here comes from the fact that the object
that competitors vie for—here subsidies—is itself endogenous, as from equation (19), the pot
of subsidies depends on the distribution of “bids”, namely the holdings of foreign bonds.
An interesting feature of these equilibria is that they display a force for endogenous di-
versification. Bankers choose to hold foreign bonds even in the absence of regulation. This
is because they cannot be certain to count on a bailout by the Sovereign. We illustrate this
possibility with two simple examples in Section C.7. In the first example, the distribution G
is a degenerate atom. In the second example, it is non-degenerate. In both cases, we abstract
away from regulation and set r̄ = 0.64
B.3 The Role of Leverage
In this section, we introduce leverage into the model. We assume that a fraction ρ0(s) of
the return ρ1(s) is pledgeable to outside international investors at date 1. Bankers can now
63For b∗0 in the interior of the support of G, π must be absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue
measure in the neighborhood of s(b∗0) with Radon-Nikodym derivative dπ(s) = π(s)ds, and the entrepreneur
must be left indifferent by marginal changes in b∗0 , which requires that the following differential equation in


















The left-hand-side represents the marginal utility gain from securing bailouts in more states of the world, while
the right-hand-side represents the utility loss in states where no bailout is required to fund the investment.
64Another form of bailout rat race is developed in Nosal-Ordonez (2016). In their paper as in ours, the
Sovereign ex ante dislikes bailing out banks, but cannot help doing so when faced with the fait accompli. The
innovation of their paper is that a bank can be rescued either by the Sovereign or (more cheaply) by a healthy
bank and the Sovereign prefers a private takeover to a public takeover. The Sovereign however does not know
whether the first distressed bank’s shock is idiosyncratic or aggregate (in which case there will be no healthy
bank to rescue the distressed one). In a situation in which the conditional probability of an aggregate shock is
not too large, the Sovereign waits, and therefore banks prefer not to be the first distressed institution. If they
can sink resources to augment the probability of not being first, they will do so, a behavior akin to a rat race.
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raise ρ0(s) < 1 units of funds per unit of investment at date 1. Consistent with our previ-
ous assumptions, we assume that financial claims on ρ0(s) are issued abroad. This can be
accommodated by our formalization along the lines of Holmström-Tirole (1997). Because we
assume away the possibility of debt forgiveness, there is no supervisory leniency. We make
use throughout of the fact that r = r̄.
Leverage and financial shocks. Because bankers can lever up, they only need a net worth
of I(s)− ρ0(s) in order to invest I(s). As a result, the required bailout is now
X(s) = max{I(s)− ρ0(s)− (b∗0 + p1(s)b0), 0}.
The pricing equation (10) is unchanged, leading to the following fixed-point for the date-1
price p1(s) of domestic sovereign bonds
p1(s) = 1− F(B1(s)|s),
where






Proposition 16 (Feedback Loop and Leverage). When a fraction ρ0(s) of the date-2 return of the
investment project of bankers is pledgeable, the sensitivity of date-1 bond prices p1(s) to the state s












Proposition 16 extends Proposition 1 to the case where leverage is positive. The main
difference is that the financing needs I(s) are replaced by I(s)(1 − ρ0(s)). This is simply
because bankers can leverage every unit of bailout with private funds by borrowing ρ0(s)
units of funds from international investors.
Joint defaults. So far we have ignored the possibility that private debt contracts of bankers
might be defaulted upon. In other words, we have assumed that the enforcement of pri-
vate debt contracts is perfect. In reality, whether or not to enforce private contracts is to a
large extent a decision by the domestic Sovereign. And the decisions to enforce private debt
contracts and to repay sovereign debt tend to be correlated. After all, not enforcing private
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debt contracts is another way for the Sovereign to default on the country’s obligations.65 We
capture this idea by assuming that the costs of not enforcing debt contracts and to default on
sovereign debt take the form of a single fixed cost. This feature builds in a complementarity
between the two decisions. As a result, sovereign defaults come together with defaults on
the private debt contracts issues by bankers, resulting in a positive correlation between bank
and sovereign spreads.
Private debt contracts are priced fairly and reflect the probability that they will not be
enforced. As a result, leverage becomes endogenous. Entrepreneurs can raise ρ0(s)p1(s)
units of funds per unit of investment. The fact that the debt that they raise bears enforcement
risk limits their ability to raise funds at date 1, and increases the size of the required bailout
to
X(s) = max{I(s)(1− ρ0(s)p1(s))− (b∗0 + p1(s)b0), 0}.
The pricing equation (10) is unchanged, leading to the following fixed-point for the date-1
price p1(s) of domestic sovereign bonds
p1(s) = 1− F(B1(s)|s),
where






Proposition 17 (Feedback Loop and Joint Defaults). When a fraction ρ0(s) of the date-2 return
of the investment project of bankers is pledgeable and private debt contracts are defaulted upon when
there is a sovereign default, the sensitivity of date-1 bond prices p1(s) to the state s when a bailout is












There are two key differences between Proposition 17 and Proposition 16. The first differ-
ence is that the second term in the numerator is now − 1p1(s) f (B1(s)|s)
d[I(s)−ρ0(s)p1(s)]
ds instead
of − 1p1(s) f (B1(s)|s)
d[I(s)−ρ0(s)]
ds , reflecting the dependence of the liquidity needs of bankers
on p1(s) through the pledgeability of returns and leverage. The second difference is in the
65In our model, private financial contracts are between domestic agents (bankers) and foreign agents (inter-
national investors). A more general model would also feature private financial contracts between domestic
agents. To the extent that enforcement decisions cannot discriminate between contracts based on the identities
of the parties to the contract, this introduces potential additional costs to the decision of not enforcing private
contracts. These costs are both ex-post in the form of undesirable redistribution and ex-ante in the form of a
reduction in private trade between domestic agents (see e.g. Broner and Ventura 2011). We purposefully stay
away from these fascinating issues, which are not the focus of this paper.
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denominator. For given values of the date-1 bond price p1(s), of the reinvestment need
I(s), of the bailout X(s), and hence of date-1 debt B1(s), the denominator is now smaller at
1− I(s)−r̄
p21(s)
f (B1(s)|s) instead of 1− I(s)−ρ0(s)p1(s)−r̄p21(s)
f (B1(s)|s). As a result the sensitivity dp1(s)ds
of the price p1(s) to the state s is larger.
The feedback loop is stronger, because of a new mechanism operating through the en-
dogenous leverage of banks. As sovereign risk rises, banks have to reduce leverage. This is
because banks’ borrowing spreads increase, reflecting the increased probability of a default
on the private debt that they issue. This requires a larger bailout, which puts further pressure
on the Sovereign budget etc., ad infinitum.
B.4 Foreign Banks in the Foreign (Safe) Country
In our basic model, we abstracted from foreign banks in the foreign (safe) country. We can
introduce such banks. These face a similar problem to domestic banks. They have some net
worth AF at date 0, and some investment opportunities IF(s) at date 1 with private and
foreign social returns given by ρF1 (s) and β
I,F(s). We assume that with AF ≥ ĪF where
ĪF = maxs∈S IF(s). Foreign banks invest their net worth at date 0 in a portfolio of risky
“domestic” bonds (bonds of the domestic economy) and safe “foreign” bonds (bonds of the
foreign economy).66 The return on their portfolio at date 1 determines their net worth at date
1. If it falls short of their investment need, then they are bailed out by the foreign Sovereign.
But these bailouts do not endanger the ability of the foreign Sovereign to repay its debt. The
domestic and foreign countries differ only in the riskiness of their sovereign bonds. Domestic
sovereign bonds are risky and foreign sovereign bonds are safe. We denote by r̄F the super-
visory capability of the foreign Sovereign, and by rF the effective minimum diversification
requirement.
Our analysis goes through in this extended model as long as risk-neutral international
investors who do not benefit from bailout guarantees (not foreign banks) remain the marginal
buyers of domestic and foreign sovereign bonds. In particular, Propositions 1-15 still hold
without any modification. The key observation is that foreign banks’ portfolio decisions are
irrelevant for equilibrium prices, domestic bailouts and sovereign default probabilities, and
domestic banks’ portfolio decisions. Foreign banks’ risk exposures do not give rise to any
feedback loop, because the foreign Sovereign has enough fiscal capacity to bail them out
without endangering its ability to repay its debt.
66Of course domestic bonds are foreign bonds from the perspective of foreign banks, and similarly foreign
bonds are domestic bonds from the perspective of foreign banks. To avoid confusion, we always refer to domes-
tic bonds as the sovereign bonds of the domestic economy, independently of whether they are held by domestic
or foreign agents. Similarly, we refer to foreign bonds as the bonds of the foreign economy, independently of
whether they are held by domestic of foreign agents.
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The extended model has additional predictions on the incentives of foreign banks and of
the foreign Sovereign. Because of the bailout guarantees, foreign banks have an incentive to
load up on risky domestic debt. The foreign Sovereign has an incentive to regulate foreign
banks so that they do not take on too much domestic sovereign risk. We elaborate on these
issues now.
Frictionless supervision of foreign banks in the foreign (safe) country. We first consider
first optimal supervision in the foreign (safe) country as in Section 3.1. We can derive the
following equivalent of Propositions 2 and 3.
Proposition 18 (Supervision in Foreign (Safe) Country). When the basic model in Section 3.1 is
extended to include foreign banks in the foreign (safe) country, there is no supervisory leniency in the
foreign (safe) country so that rF = r̄F. Moreover when the supervisory capability r̄F can be chosen at
no cost by the foreign Sovereign (first-best frictionless supervision), it is optimal to set r̄F = ĪF. All
these statements are true whether or not debt forgiveness is allowed.
Just like the domestic Sovereign in the absence of debt forgiveness, the foreign Sovereign
has an incentive to prevent its banks from taking on (domestic) sovereign risk. This is because
when foreign banks take on more risk, they receive a bailout from the foreign Sovereign
following a bad shock, which has adverse distributional effects.
In the presence of debt forgiveness, Proposition 18 displays a sharp contrast between the
supervisory incentives of the domestic Sovereign and those of the foreign Sovereign. Be-
cause foreign sovereign debt is safe, the foreign Sovereign cannot extract any concessions
from its creditors. As a result, the foreign Sovereign has no incentive to engage in strategic
supervisory leniency. Instead it always seeks to strictly limit the exposure of foreign banks to
domestic sovereign risk. We refer the reader to Section C.6 for additional results in the con-
text of the simple example of Section C.1 which can be solved in closed form. In particular,
we uncover an additional rationale for a banking union in the presence of costly or imperfect
supervision: Domestic supervision has positive external effects for the foreign country, these
effects are not internalized by the domestic Sovereign, and as a result, supervision is too lax
in the domestic economy.67
67Bolton-Jeanne (2011) also study the international contagion of sovereign debt crises through the financial
sector and their international fiscal implications.
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C Online Appendix: Illustration of Some Results and Addi-
tional Results in a Simple Example
In this appendix, we construct a simple example of our general setup, which can be solved
in closed form. We then put to it to use to illustrate some of the results in the paper, and to
derive additional results.
C.1 Illustrative Example
We assume that I(s) = Ī = A and ρ1(s) = ρ1 for all s, and that r̄ ≤ A. The structure
of uncertainty is as follows. With probability π, the state s is H and the endowment is high
enough at E that there is no default. With probability 1−π, the state is L and the endowment
is high enough at E so that there is no default with conditional probability x, intermediate e
with conditional probability y, and 0 with conditional probability 1− x− y. In addition, we
assume that e > B0.
For E ≥ B1(L) > e, we have 1− F(B1(L)|L) = x and so p1(L) = x and p0 = π + (1−π)x.
For e ≥ B1(L) ≥ 0, we have 1 − F(B1(L)|L) = x + y and so p1(L) = x + y and p0 =
π + (1− π)(x + y). Depending on which of (E − B0)x and (x + y)(e − B0) is greater, the
level of debt B1(L) that maximizes revenue in state L is either E or e.
C.2 Multiple Equilibria in a Simple Example for Appendix A.3
In this section, se show that the strategic complementarities identified in Appendix A.3 can
lead to multiple equilibria. We demonstrate this possibility in the simple example introduced
in Section C.1, which can be solved in closed form. We also provide global comparative
statics results in the context of this example.
We assume that (E − B0)x > (x + y)(e − B0) so that the revenue maximizing level of
debt B1(L) in state L is E. We assume throughout that (Ψ′)−1(
π(1−π)(1−θ)
π+(1−π)θ ) ∈ (0, r̄) for θ ∈
{x, x + y}. There are two possible equilibria depending on whether B1(L) ≤ e or B1(L) > e,
which determines the probability θ of repayment in state L. When B1(L) ≤ e, we have
θ = x + y, and when B1(L) > e, we have θ = x. And prices are given by p1(L) = θ,
p0 = π + (1− π)θ.




− 1)]+ (1−π)ρ1A = ρ1A+π(A− b∗0(i))
(1− π)(1− θ)




In order for bankers to choose b∗0 ∈ (0, r̄), we must have
Ψ′(r̄− b∗0(i)) =
π(1− π)(1− θ)
π + (1− π)θ .
The debt issuance condition is then
B1(L) = B0 + Φ(θ),





π + (1− π)θ [A− r̄ + (Ψ
′)−1(
π(1− π)(1− θ)
π + (1− π)θ )].
We have an equilibrium with B1(L) ≤ e if and only if
Φ(x + y) ≤ e− B0. (23)
Similarly, we have an equilibrium with B1(L) > e if and only if
e− B0 < Φ(x) ≤ E− B0. (24)
The two equilibria coexist if and only if
E− B0 ≥ Φ(x) > e− B0 ≥ Φ(x + y). (25)
Because the function Φ is decreasing, we can always find values of B0, E and e such that
condition (25) is verified so that there can be multiple equilibria for a range of parameter
values. These multiple equilibria are a consequence of the strategic complementarities in the
banks’ individual exposures to domestic sovereign default risk.
Proposition 19 (Multiple Equilibria). In the illustrating example, there are two possible equilibria.
There is an equilibrium with low diversification b∗0 = r̄ − (Ψ′)−1(
π(1−π)(1−x)
π+(1−π)x ) and a high proba-
bility of default (1− π)(1− x), which exists if and only if condition (23) is verified. There is also
an equilibrium with high diversification b∗0 = r̄ − (Ψ′)−1(
π(1−π)(1−x−y)
π+(1−π)(x+y) ) and a low probability of
default (1− π)(1− x− y), which exists if and only if condition (24) is verified. The two equilibria
coexist if and only if condition (25) is verified.
This example also has other interesting implications.
Proposition 20 (Multiple Equilibria and Debt Re-nationalization). In the illustrating example,
for B0 ∈ (0, E − Φ(x)), the equilibrium with low diversification and high probability of default
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is more likely to exist, the higher is legacy debt B0 and the lower is fiscal capacity (proxied by the
intermediate value of the endowment e). Conversely, the equilibrium with high diversification and low
probability of default is more likely to exist, the lower is legacy debt and the higher is fiscal capacity.
C.3 Strategic Supervisory Leniency and Debt Re-Nationalization in a Sim-
ple Example for Section 4.1
In this section, we provide an illustration of the results in Section 4.1 in the context of the
simple example introduced in Section C.1, which can be solved in closed form.
Recall that in this example, I(s) = Ī is independent of s and A = Ī. We assume that
e(1 + yx ) > B0 > e and that β
I(s) = βI is independent of s. We assume that supervisory
capability is not too low A − π+(1−π)x
π(1−x) [e(x + y) − xB0] ≤ r̄. We now proceed to construct
an equilibrium where it is optimal for the Sovereign r < r̄ so as to obtain concessions from
legacy creditors.
There is no debt forgiveness in state H and no default. At date 1, in state L, legacy cred-









in which case B1(L) = e. There is debt forgiveness provided that when B0(L) is defined by
equation (26), the following condition is verified:
(x + y)B0(L) ≥ xB0. (27)




(1− xp0 )(A− r)
x + y
≤ e. (28)
In order to maximize welfare
W0 = π(E− B0) + (1− π)[x(E− e)− (1− x− y)Φ] + βI A




It is then always optimal for the Sovereign to choose at date 0 the lowest value of r that
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The date-0 price is then given by p0 = π + (1 − π)x.68 And the equilibrium effective
diversification requirement is then r = r(π + (1− π)x) which is guaranteed to be less than r̄
by our assumption that supervisory capability is not too low.
Proposition 21 (Strategic Supervisory Leniency). In the illustrating example, it is optimal for
the Sovereign to engage in strategic supervisory leniency by setting r = r(π + (1 − π)x) < r̄.
The equilibrium effective diversification requirement r is decreasing in the probability 1− π of the
occurrence of the bad fiscal shock (state L).
The Sovereign reduces the effective diversification requirement (lowers r) when the prob-
ability 1− π of a bad fiscal shock where a debt renegotiation takes place increases, because
it makes it more attractive to extract concessions from legacy creditors.
C.4 Rationale for a Banking Union in a Simple Example for Section 4.1
In this section, we provide an illustration of the results in Section 4.1 in the context of the
simple example introduced in Section C.1, which can be solved in closed form.
We build on Section C.3. Consider the debt level B′0 > B0 that generates the same amount
of revenue at date 0 when the effective diversification requirement is r′ = r(π + (1− π)x) as
the debt level B0 wh%n the effective diversification requirement is r = r̄. This debt level is
defined implicitly by the equation
[π + (1− π)x]B′0 = p0(r̄; π, B0)B0,
where we assume that the solution of this equation satisfies e(1 + tr ) > B
′
0 > e, and where
p0(r̄; π, B0) denotes the date-0 price when the effective diversification requirement is r =
68We have p0 = π + (1− π)(x + y) B0(L)B0 , which using (x + y)B0(L) = xB0 implies p0 = π + (1− π)x.
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r̄.69,70,71,72
We necessarily haveW0 >W ′0 .73
Proposition 22 (Banking Union). If the relaxation of supervision is fully priced in by interna-
tional investors at the time of the issuance of date-0 debt, then the domestic Sovereign faces a time-
inconsistency problem. It is made better off by promising not to engage in supervisory leniency and
to set a high effective diversification requirement r = r̄ before issuing debt at date 0, but it is tempted
to relax this requirement after the issuance and lower r below r̄. A banking union removes this temp-
tation and improves welfare.
C.5 Multiple Risky Countries in a Simple Example for Section 5.2
In this section, we illustrate the results of Section 5.2 in the context of the simple example
introduced in Section C.1, which can be solved in closed form.
For simplicity, we carry out our multiple-country extension in the context of our illustrat-
ing example. There are two states H and L at date 1 for each country with probability π and
1− π. Let kH be the probability that country B is in state H if country A is in state H. Let kL
be the probability that country B is in state L if country A is in state L. Symmetry imposes
that
(1− π)(1− kL) = π(1− kH).
69The function p0(r̄; π, B0) is itself defined implicitly by the following equation




This equation has a unique solution (the left-hand side is increasing in p0 while the right-hand side is decreasing
in p0), which defines a function p0(r̄; π, B0) which is increasing in r̄, decreasing in B0 and increasing in π.
70The function p0(r̄; π, B0) is locally increasing in r̄ if and only if e(x + y) < p0(r̄; π, B0)B0. It is easy to see
that this inequality automatically holds when r̄ = A. This implies that it holds for all r̄. Indeed, suppose
that there exists r̄ < A such that e(x + y) > p0(r̄; π, B0)B0. Then as we increase r̄ from that point towards
A, p0(r̄; π, B0) keeps decreasing and hence e(x + y) > p0(r̄; π, B0)B0 keeps being verified, a contradiction.
Therefore e(x + y) ≤ p0(r̄; π, B0)B0 for all r̄. This in turn implies that p0(r̄; π, B0) is increasing in r̄.
71That the function is decreasing in B0 follows from the fact that the left-hand side of equation (30) is increas-
ing in p0 and independent of B0, while the right-hand side is decreasing in p0 and decreasing in B0.
72That the function is increasing in π follows from the fact that the left-hand side of equation (30) is increasing
in p0 and independent of π, while the right-hand side is decreasing in p0 and increasing in π. To see that the




where B0(L) ≤ B0.
73This is immediate since under commitment and no commitment, all investments are financed, defaults
occur in the same states, and foreigners are as well off. As a result, the sum of consumer welfare and banker






0 . However the welfare of







βB < 1, this implies that W0 = WC0 + β
BVB0 + β
I A− (1− π)(1− x− y)Φ is greater than W ′0 = VC′0 + βBVB′0 +
βI A− (1− π)(1− x− y)Φ.
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We assume that kH < 1 and kL < 1 so that shocks in the two countries are not perfectly
correlated.
In state H in country i ∈ {A,B}, date-2 fiscal revenues are equal to E with probability
1, and investment needs are equal to I and the return on investment is equal to ρH1 . In state
L in country i ∈ {A,B}, date-2 fiscal revenues are equal to E with probability x, e with
probability y, and 0 with probability 1− x− y, investment needs are equal to Ī, and the return
on investment is equal to ρH1 . We assume that I < Ī = A. Hence fiscal and balance sheet
shocks are positively correlated in a given country. As will be clear below, it is important
for our results that I < Ī, but the size of the gap between I and Ī is not important. In other
words, it only matters that there be some positive correlation between balance sheet and
fiscal shocks. Although this is not important, we assume that ρH1 I > ρ
L
1 Ī so that state H
(respectively L) corresponds to a state with high (respectively low) future profits but low
(respectively high) liquidity needs.
Home bias with multiple risky countries. We assume that E is large enough so that p1(H, H) =
1 and p1(H, L) = 1. But we have p1(L, L) < 1 and p1(L, H) < 1. We show that as long as
p1(L, H) is not too high, then banks in country j choose to hold as little safe foreign bonds
and as much risky domestic bonds as allowed by supervision, but no risky foreign bonds.
Proposition 23 (Home Bias with Multiple Risky Countries). Consider the illustrating example
with two symmetric risky countries i ∈ {A,B}. Then there exists a symmetric equilibrium in which
p1(L, H) ≤ p0 and banks in each country i ∈ {A,B} choose to hold as little safe foreign bonds and as





and b f0 = 0.
74 This equilibrium is strict. Moreover, there are no other symmetric equilibria with
p1(L, H) ≤ p0.
Proof. We show that in any symmetric equilibrium as long as p1(L, H) ≤ p0, banks in each
country i ∈ {A,B} prefer to choose the following portfolio: b∗0 = r̄, bd0 = A−r̄p0 and b
f
0 = 0. To-
gether with the fact that when banks do indeed choose this portfolio, p1(L, H) = p1(L, L) <
p0 < p1(L, H) = p1(H, H) = 1, this proves the proposition.
Consider a country i ∈ {A,B}. For the same reasons as in the main model, banks in
country i will choose holdings of safe sovereign bonds of exactly r̄. The payoff of a banker in
74The condition that p1(L, H) ≤ p0 is equivalent to the assumption that there are bailouts when state L occurs
in country i and state H occurs in country−i if banks of country i choose portfolio b∗0 = r̄, bd0 =
A−r̄
p0
and b f0 = 0.
Proposition 23 then shows that there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium that satisfies this condition, and
that in this equilibrium, banks choose the aforementioned portfolio.
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πkH[ρH1 I + max{A− I + (1− p0)bd0 + (1− p0)b
f
0 , 0}]
+ (1− π)kL[ρL1 Ī + max{A− Ī + (p1(L, L)− p0)bd0 + (p1(L, L)− p0)b
f
0 , 0}]
+ π(1− kH)[ρH1 I + max{A− I + (1− p0)bd0 + (p1(L, H)− p0)b
f
0 , 0}]
+ (1− π)(1− kL)[ρL1 Ī + max{A− Ī + (p1(L, H)− p0)bd0 + (1− p0)b
f
0 , 0}].
Only the last two terms of the expression above matters for portfolio choice of the banker.
The sum of the last two terms is a convex function of bd0 and b
f
0 . The optimal portfolio is
therefore necessarily a corner solution (b0, 0) or (0, b0). We now compute the value of the
sum of the last two terms at these two corners.
For bd0 = b0, the value of the sum of the last two terms is
π(1− kH)[ρH1 I + max{A− I + (1− p0)b0, 0}]
+ (1− π)(1− kL)[ρL1 Ī + max{A− Ī + (p1(L, H)− p0)b0, 0}].
Since A− Ī + (p1(L, H)− p0)b0 ≤ 0 (recall that A = Ī), this can be re-expressed as
π(1− kH)[ρH1 I + A− I + (1− p0)b0] + (1− π)(1− kL)ρL1 Ī.
For bd0 = 0, the value of the sum of the last two terms is
π(1− kH)[ρH1 I + max{A− I + (p1(L, H)− p0)b0, 0}]
+ (1− π)(1− kL)[ρL1 Ī + max{A− Ī + (1− p0)b0, 0}].
If A− I + (p1(L, H)− p0)b0 ≤ 0, this can be re-expressed as
π(1− kH)ρH1 I + (1− π)(1− kL)[ρL1 Ī + A− Ī + (1− p0)b0],
which is less than the value with bd0 = b0. If A − I + (p1(L, H) − p0)b0 > 0, this can be
re-expressed as
π(1− kH)[ρH1 I + A− I + (p1(L, H)− p0)b0] + (1− π)(1− kL)[ρL1 Ī + A− Ī + (1− p0)b0]
= π(1− kH)[ρH1 I + A− I +(1− p0)b0] + (1−π)(1− kL)[ρL1 Ī + A− Ī +(p1(L, H)− p0)b0],
which is again less than the value for bd0 = b0.




Strategic supervisory leniency with multiple risky countries. We assume that e(1 + yx ) >
B0 > e and that βI(s) = βI is independent of s. For simplicity, we consider the limit where
I = Ī = A. We can derive the following counterpart to Proposition 21, which shows that
Sovereigns in risky countries have an incentive to let their banks load up on risky domestic
sovereign debt as opposed to risky foreign sovereign debt, in order to maximize the conces-
sions from legacy creditors.
Proposition 24 (Strategic Supervisory Leniency and Debt Re-Nationalization with Multiple
Risky Countries). Consider the illustrating example with two risky countries and assume that B0 <
E. In the limit where A is small compared to e and B0, it is optimal for the Sovereign in country i to
force its banks to invest all their net worth A in risky domestic sovereign bonds, and to invest zero in





and b f0 = 0.
Proof. We consider a symmetric equilibrium, and denote with a tilde the equilibrium values,
assuming, as we will verify below, that b̃ f0 = 0. And we look at the incentives of the Sovereign






















controlled by the Sovereign in country i.
We assume that E is large enough that the price of debt in a given country is always one
when this country is in state H (this condition is guaranteed to hold in the limit where A is
small compared to e and B0).
If we have debt forgiveness in state (L, H), then the post-debt forgiveness amount of debt
B0(L, H) satisfies
B0(L, H) +





b f0 = e,
and B1(L, H) = e. If we have debt forgiveness in state (L, L), then the post-debt forgiveness
amount of debt B0(L, L) satisfies
B0(L, L) +
p0 − (x + y)B0(L,L)B0
x + y
bd0 +
p̃0 − (x + y) B̃0(L,L)B0
x + y
b f0 = e,
and B1(L, L) = e.
There is debt forgiveness provided that the following conditions are verified:
(x + y)B0(L, H) ≥ xB0,
and
(x + y)B0(L, L) ≥ xB0.
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These conditions are always verified when A is small enough compared to e and B0,
It is then always optimal for the Sovereign to choose at date 0 the values of (bd0 , b
f
0) that
maximize welfare (taking p0 as given)
W0 = π(E− B0) + (1− π)[x(E− e)− (1− x− y)Φ] + βI A + βBρ1A
+ πkHG{(1− p0)bd0 + (1− p̃0)b
f
0}
+ (1− π)kLH{((x + y)B0(L, L)
B0












+ (1− π)(1− kL)H{((x + y)B0(L, H)
B0
− p0)bd0 + (1− p̃0)b
f
0},
where G(x) = βB max{x, 0}+ min{x, 0} and H(x) = βB max{x, 0}. This defines two func-
tions bd0(p0) and b
f
0(p0).
The date-0 price p0 is then given by the fixed-point equation
p0 = π + (1− π)(x + y)
(1− kL)B0(L, H) + kLB0(L, L)
B0
,







In the limit where A is small compared to e and B0, the last four terms of the expression
for welfare W0 can be rewritten (up to a first order approximation),
πkHG{(1− (π + (1− π)(x + y) e
B0











− (π+(1−π)(x+ y) e
B0
))b f0}
+ π(1− kH)G{(1− (π + (1− π)(x + y) e
B0
))bd0 + ((x + y)
e
B0
− (π + (1− π)(x + y) e
B0
))b f0}
+(1−π)(1− kL)H{((x+ y) e
B0
− (π+(1−π)(x+ y) e
B0




The solution is clearly bd0 =
A
π+(1−π)(x+y) eB0
and b f0 = 0.
Obviously, if the Sovereign could not determine the relative holdings of domestic and
foreign risky bond holdings, but only impose an effective requirement b∗0 ≥ r with r ≤ b∗0 ,
then we would obtain (in the limit where I tends to Ī = A from below) that it is optimal




and b f0 = 0. Proposition 24 shows the more interesting result that even if
the supervisor could perfectly control the portfolios of banks, it would choose to encourage
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them to load up on domestic risky bonds.
C.6 Foreign Banks in the Foreign (Safe) Country in a Simple Example for
Section B.4
In this section, we illustrate the results of Section B.4 in the context of the simple example of
Section C.1, which can be solved in closed form. We also provide additional results.
First, note that specializing the model to the illustrating example, Proposition 18 can be
used to show that as the probability 1− π of a bad domestic fiscal shock increases, domestic
supervision of domestic banks gets laxer, but foreign supervision of foreign banks does not,
and as a result domestic banks tilt their portfolios towards risky domestic bonds and away
from safe foreign bonds, but foreign banks do not.
Collective moral hazard, debt re-nationalization, and foreign banks in the foreign (safe)
country. It is also interesting to investigate the portfolio decisions of foreign banks in the
environment of Section 3.3, assuming that foreign banks face a cost of making their balance
sheets opaque ΨF similar to that of domestic banks and that IF(s) = ĪF is independent of
s and that AF = ĪF. Using the fact that rF = r̄F, we can derive the following equivalent of
Proposition 19.
Proposition 25 (Multiple Equilibria). When the illustrating example of Section 3.3 is extended to
include foreign banks in the foreign (safe) country, the portfolio of foreign banks is given by bF∗0 = r̄
F−
(ΨF′)−1(π(1−π)(1−θ)
π+(1−π)(θ) ) with θ = x in the low (domestic) diversification equilibrium and θ = x + y
in the high (domestic) diversification equilibrium.
Foreign banks’ exposure to domestic sovereign risk is higher in the low (domestic) diver-
sification equilibrium than in the high (domestic) diversification equilibrium.75
The key observation that underlies these results is that there are strategic complemen-
tarities running from domestic banks’ to foreign banks, but no strategic complementarities
running in the other direction. Indeed, when domestic banks increase their exposure to do-
mestic sovereign risk, the benefits of doing so also increases for foreign banks. But when
foreign banks increase their exposure to domestic sovereign risk, the benefits of doing for
domestic banks remains unchanged. This is because the riskiness of domestic debt increases
in the former case but not in the latter.
This also implies that there are supervisory externalities running from the domestic coun-
try to the foreign (safe) country but not vice versa. Indeed, suppose that at some supervisory
75Note that contrary to domestic and foreign banks, international investors have less exposure to domes-
tic sovereign risk in the low (domestic) diversification equilibrium than in the high (domestic) diversification
equilibrium.
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cost R (respectively RF), the domestic (respectively foreign) Sovereign can achieve perfect su-
pervision with supervisory capability r̄ = A (respectively r̄F = AF), in which case, because
our example assumes that there is no debt forgiveness, we also have r = r̄ = A (respectively
rF = r̄F = AF). Otherwise, supervision is inexistent (Ψ and ΨF are both zero), so that banks
can perfectly evade regulation. Assume that B0 + 1x
π(1−x)
π+(1−π)x A > e > B0.
If the domestic Sovereign chooses to incur the supervisory cost R, we have B1(L) = B0
and θ = x + y. Otherwise B1(L) = B0 + 1x
π(1−x)
π+(1−π)x A and θ = x. In both cases, we have
p1(L) = θ and p0 = π + (1− π)θ.
The net gain (1−π)(1− βB)AF π(1−θ)
π+(1−π)θ − R
F from incurring the supervisory cost for the
foreign Sovereign is lower (θ = x) when the domestic Sovereign incurs the supervisory cost
than when it doesn’t (θ = x + y). By contrast, the net gain from incurring the supervisory
cost for the domestic Sovereign is independent of whether or not the domestic Sovereign
incurs the supervisory cost. More interestingly, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 26 (Supervisory Externalities and Banking Union). In the illustrating example with
either perfect or irrelevant supervision and foreign banks in the foreign (safe) country, foreign welfare
increases with the supervisory effort (decreases with the supervisory cost) of the domestic country, but
domestic welfare is independent of the supervisory effort (independent of the supervisory cost) of the
foreign country.
Proposition 26 uncovers an additional rationale for a banking union. Domestic supervi-
sion has positive external effects for the foreign country. These effects are not internalized
by the domestic Sovereign, and as a result, supervision is too lax in the domestic economy.
By transferring supervisory decisions from the national to the international level, a banking
union allows these effects to be internalized, leading to a toughening of supervision in the
domestic country and an improvement of welfare.
C.7 Limited Bailouts and Endogenous Diversification in a Simple Exam-
ple for Appendix B.2
In this section, we provide two illustrations of limited bailouts and endogenous diversifica-
tion as outlined in Appendix B.2, in the context of the simple example introduced in Section
2.1, which can be solved in closed form. In the first example, the distribution G is a degener-
ate atom. In the second example, it is non-degenerate. In both cases, we abstract away from
regulation and set r̄ = 0.
Illustrating example 1. Our first example is a variant of the example in Section 2.1. We
assume that (E− B0)x < (x + y)(e− B0), so that the revenue maximizing level of B1(L) in
state L is e.
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Our candidate equilibrium is symmetric with B1(L) = e, p1(L) = x + y and p0 = π +
(1− π)(x + y).76 The limited-bailout condition is
π(1− x− y)
π + (1− π)(x + y) (A− b
∗
0) = (e− B0)(x + y). (31)
In order for bankers to prefer b∗0 to 0, we must have
π[
1
π + (1− π)(x + y) − 1]b
∗
0 ≤ (1− π)A[ρ1 −
x + y
π + (1− π)(x + y) ]. (32)
The solution b∗0 of equation (31) always (strictly) verifies equation (32). This guarantees that
our candidate equilibrium is indeed an equilibrium as long as the solution of equation (31)
verifies 0 < b∗0 < A.
Illustrating example 2. We now consider a simple variant of the previous example. The
structure of uncertainty is as follows. With probability π, the state s is H and the endowment
is high enough at E that there is no default. With probability (1− π)z, the state is M, and
the endowment is high enough at E so that there is no default with conditional probability
x, intermediate eM with conditional probability y, and 0 with conditional probability 1− x−
y. With probability (1− π)(1− z), the state is L, and the endowment is high enough at E
so that there is no default with conditional probability x, intermediate eL with conditional
probability y, and 0 with conditional probability 1 − x − y. What distinguishes states M
and L is that eM > eL. We assume that (x + y)(eL − B0) > (E − B0)x so that the revenue
maximizing level of debt is eM in state M and eL in state L.
Our candidate asymmetric equilibrium is such that there are full bailouts in the medium
state, but limited bailouts in the low state. Bankers invest b̂∗0(L) with probability φ and 0 with
probability 1− φ. Prices are p0 = π + (1− π)(x + y), p1(L) = p1(M) = x + y.
The bailout conditions are
φ
π(1− x− y)
π + (1− π)(x + y) (A− b̂
∗
0(L)) = (eL − B0)(x + y), (33)
φ
π(1− x− y)
π + (1− π)(x + y) (A− b̂
∗
0(L)) + (1− φ)
π(1− x− y)
π + (1− π)(x + y)A ≤ (eM − B0)(x + y). (34)




0 = 0, we must have
π[
1
π + (1− π)(x + y) − 1]b̂
∗
0(L) = A(1− z)(1− π)[ρ1 −
x + y
π + (1− π)(x + y) ]. (35)
76It can be shown that there are no asymmetric equilibria in this example.
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We can rewrite equation (35) as
b̂∗0(L) = A(1− z)[(ρ1 − 1)
π + (1− π)(x + y)
π(1− x− y) + 1].






1− (1− z)[(ρ1 − 1)π+(1−π)(x+y)π(1−x−y) + 1]
.
We have an equilibrium if b̂∗0(L) < A, 0 < φ < 1, and
(1− φ) π(1− x− y)
π + (1− π)(x + y)A ≤ (eM − eL)(x + y),
which can always be ensured for appropriate parameter values.
Proposition 27 (Bailout Rat-Race and Incentives for Diversification). In the illustrating exam-
ples with limited bailouts and symmetric or asymmetric equilibria, it is optimal for banks to not fully
load up on domestic sovereign default risk and instead choose a non-zero degree of diversification
b∗0 > 0 with positive probability even when there is no regulation (r̄ = 0).
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